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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO IN AND FOR THE CO TY OF IDAHO
)
)
)

GERALD R. PIZZL'TO, JR.,

CASE NO. CV2003 -34 748

)

Petitioner~

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT

)
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
)
)

Respond ent.

THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
1) Petitione r shall have until

o ember 18 2019 to file a Reply Brief·

2) Oral Argume nt is schedule d for Decemb er 10, 2019 at 1:30 p.m. Pacific Time,
parties may appear in person or telephon ically.

DATED this

\l,t- day of October, 2019.

ORDER SCHE UL I G B I EFS
AD ARGUMEN T
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that a true copy of the foregoing ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS AND
ARGUMENT was emailed, by the undersigned thist] day of October, 2019, on:
Lamont Anderson
Lamon t.anderson@ag.idaho.gov
Jonah Horwitz
Jonah horwitz@fd.org

ORDER SCHEDULING BRIEFS
AND ARGUMENT
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Electronically Filed
10/7/2019 11 :40 AM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Nikki Sickels, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEND. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-4539
Fax: (208) 854-8074
lamont.anderson@ag.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

)

Case No. CV 03-34748

)
)

Petitioner,

)

)
)

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL
NOTICE

)

)
)

Respondent.

_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)

COMES NOW, L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General for the State of
Idaho and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, State of Idaho, and does hereby
move pursuant to Rule 201, I.R.E., for an order taking judicial notice of the following:
A.

The

Clerk's

Records

and

Reporter's

transcripts

from

State

v.

Pizzuto/Pizzuto v. State, 119 Idaho 742, 810 P.2d 680 (1991); Pizzuto v. State, 127 Idaho

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1
Page 699

469, 903 P.2d 58 (1995); Pizzuto v. State, 134 Idaho 793, 10 P.3d 742 (2000); Pizzuto v.
State, 146 Idaho 720,202 P.3d 642 (2008); and Pizzuto v. State, Supreme Court No. 32678.
These documents constitute the underlying record from Petitioner's ("Pizzuto")
conviction, sentencing, first post-conviction relief case and multiple successive postconviction cases, and are necessary for resolution of Pizzuto' s current Petition for PostConviction Relief Raising Atkins v. Virginia filed June 19, 2003, and his Motion to Alter
or Amend Judgment filed September 25, 2019. See Hays v. State, 113 Idaho 736, 739, 747
P.2d 758 (Ct. App. 1987), aff'd, 115 Idaho 315,766 P.2d 895 (1988), overruled on other
grounds, State v. Guzman, 122 Idaho 981, 842 P.2d 660 (1992); Matthews v. State, 122
Idaho 801, 808, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992).
Although the parties and this Court clearly relied upon these records prior to
Pizzuto' s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment being filed, it does not appear that a formal
motion to take judicial notice of the records was ever filed with this Court. However, on
October 20, 2006, Pizzuto filed a Motion to Take Judicial Notice asking the Idaho Supreme
Court to take judicial notice of these records (Appendix A), which the Idaho Supreme Court
granted (Appendix B). Therefore, in an abundance of caution, the state is requesting this
Court to formally judicially notice those records judicially noticed by the Idaho Supreme
Court.
The state further requests this Court to judicially notice the records and documents
attached to the Affidavit of L. LaMont Anderson ("Affidavit"), which are listed below.
The documents attached to the Affidavit are documents or transcripts that were part of the
litigation in federal district court in Pizzuto v. Blades, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW, where
Pizzuto contended he could not be executed as a result of being intellectually disabled
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("ID"). "Under I.R.E. 201 (d), a court must take judicial notice of records, exhibits, or
transcripts from the court file in the same or a separate case if requested by a party and
supplied with the necessary information." Fortin v. State, 160 Idaho 437, 443, 374 P.3d
600 (Ct. App. 2016). These documents and transcripts demonstrate the breadth oflitigation
in federal court on the question of Pizzuto' s alleged ID. The transcripts comprise the
entirety of a four-day evidentiary hearing, and the documents were presented as exhibits
during that hearing. These documents and transcripts are not subject to reasonable dispute
because they can be "accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy
cannot reasonably be questioned." I.R.E. 201 (b ).
B.

January 23, 1986 letter from Dr. Michael P. Emery to the Honorable George

Reinhardt (attached as Exhibit A to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
C.

WAIS-R completed by Pizzuto at the request of Dr. Craig Beaver in 1996

(attached as Exhibit B to the Affidavit of L. LaMont Anderson);
D.

Successive Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus Seeking Relief under Atkins

v. Virginia, filed December 19, 2005, in Pizzuto v. Hardison, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW

(attached as Exhibit C to the Affidavit of L. LaMont Anderson);
E.

Forensic Psychological Evaluation by Dr. Roger B. Moore, Jr., signed June

25, 2010 (attached as Exhibit D to the Affidavit of L. LaMont Anderson);
F.

Psychological Report-Addendum by Dr. Roger B. Moore, Jr., signed June

29, 2010 (attached as Exhibit E to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
G.

Psychological Report -Addendum (2) by Dr. Roger B. Moore, Jr., signed

November 3, 2010 (attached as Exhibit F to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
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H.

Evidentiary Transcript, Day 1, Pizzuto v. Blades, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW

(attached as Exhibit G to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
I.

Evidentiary Transcript, Day 2, Pizzuto v. Blades, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW

(attached as Exhibit H to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
J.

Evidentiary Transcript, Day 3, Pizzuto v. Blades, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW

(attached as Exhibit I to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson);
K.

Evidentiary Transcript, Day 4, Pizzuto v. Blades, No. 1:05-cv-516-S-BLW

(attached as Exhibit J to the Affidavit ofL. LaMont Anderson).
The state respectfully request that the Court grant the state's Motion to Take
Judicial Notice and judicially notice the documents and transcripts listed herein.
DATED this 7th day of October, 2019.

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General and
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 7th day of October, 2019, I caused to be
served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below,
postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following:
Jonah J. Horwitz
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho - Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Email: Jonah Horwitz@fd.org

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Court Filing

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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Electronically Filed
11/14/2019 8:30 AM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Sherie Clark, Deputy Clerk

Jonah J. Horwitz, ID Bar No. 10494
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-5530
Facsimile: (208) 331-5559
Email: Jonah_Horwitz@fd.org
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
__________ )
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF
MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND
JUDGMENT PURSUANT TO
IDAHO RULE OF CIVIL
PROCEDURE 60(b)(6)
(CAPITAL CASE)

The State's response to Mr. Pizzuto's motion to alter or amend judgment (hereinafter
"Response" or "Resp.") is legally and factually unfounded, and for the reasons that follow it
should be rejected.

I.

Argument
The State erroneously maintains that Mr. Pizzuto's motion is both untimely and meritless.

Mr. Pizzuto will refute each contention in tum. 1

1

Because intellectual disability is a categorical exemption from the death penalty, see, e.g.,
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 61 (2010), the nature of the crime is largely irrelevant. Even
so, to ensure the Court harbors no misperceptions about the facts, Mr. Pizzuto corrects the State's
suggestion that he shot Del Herndon. See Resp. at 2. The statement is pulled from the Idaho
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 1
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A.

The Motion is Timely

With respect to timeliness, the State's overarching mistake is to rely on the wrong body
of law. The fundamental premise of its argument is that Mr. Pizzuto was required to submit his
motion to alter or amend judgment within forty-two days of when the U.S. Supreme Court
released its opinion in Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014). See Resp. at 16. That timeline
comes from Idaho Code§ 19-2719(5), under which a successive post-conviction petition in a
capital case must be brought no later than forty-two days after the inmate "knew or reasonably
should have known of' the claim. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 727 (2008). 2 Confirming its
focus on Idaho Code§ 19-2719(5), the State includes a lengthy recitation of the motivations
animating that provision. See Resp. at 17.
What the State overlooks is that Mr. Pizzuto is not reopening his case with a successive
post-conviction petition. He is reopening his case with a motion to alter or amend judgment
pursuant to I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). The State does not offer a single authority to support the
proposition that a Rule 60(b) motion is subject to the timelines set forth in Idaho Code § 192719(5) and the cases interpreting it. It is an understandable omission. Rule 60(b) carries its
own restrictions on timing, namely, six months for certain types of motions and "a reasonable
time" for all of them. I.R.C.P. 60(c)(l). It is a rudimentary principle of law that the specific
"control[s] over the more general." First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc.,

Supreme Court's 2008 opinion on intellectual disability, see id., which was mistaken on the
point. As the same court recognized on direct appeal, when the facts of the conviction were
actually germane to the case, it was James Rice who shot Mr. Herndon. See State v. Pizzuto, 119
Idaho 742, 749 (1991), overruled on other grounds, State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425, 432 (1991).
Opposing counsel's brief to the Idaho Supreme Court in the 2008 case did not aver otherwise.
See Brief of Respondent, Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720 (2008) (No. 32679), 2007 WL 626854.
Rather, the Idaho Supreme Court appears to have simply misread the record.
2

In this pleading, unless otherwise noted, all internal quotation marks and citations are omitted,
all alterations are in original, and all emphasis is added.
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154 Idaho 626, 632 (2012). In this instance, the more specific clause is Rule 60(b), which was
designed to cover the exact type of motion under review now, rather than Idaho Code§ 192719(5), which encompasses any capital post-conviction action. Consistent with those
foundational principles, the Idaho Court of Appeals has recognized a distinction between the
filing of a Rule 60(b) motion and the filing of a new post-conviction petition, and has accepted
that circumstances may permit the former even if they preclude the latter. See Parvin v. State,
157 Idaho 518, 521 (Ct. App. 2014); Lopez v. State, 157 Idaho 795, 798 (Ct. App. 2014). Thus,
contrary to the State's opinion, the Rule 60(b) timeline is the governing one.
In sum, the entire framework of the State's Response is inapplicable, and its timeliness
attack can be cast aside wholesale.
If the Court's analysis proceeds further, the same result obtains. Reading the State's

Response most charitably, it suggests that the motion to alter or amend had to be filed within a
reasonable time after Hall, not after the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mr. Pizzuto's own habeas
appeal. The State's argument is a non-sequitur. Regardless of whether Hall might have served
as a valid triggering point for a different Rule 60(b) motion, the question at hand is whether the
Ninth Circuit's opinion was a valid triggering point for the motion that was actually filed. In the
memorandum in support of his motion, filed September 25, 2019 (hereinafter "Motion" or
"Mot."), Mr. Pizzuto outlined in detail why it was. See Mot. at 4-12. The State does not
meaningfully engage with that explanation, let alone defeat it. Needless to say, the State's
challenge to a strawman does nothing to undermine the basis for timeliness that has in fact been
asserted. The State does not make Mr. Pizzuto's litigation choices for him. He elected to
advance a Rule 60(b) motion in light of the Ninth Circuit's decision and has justified that
approach. The State is entitled to disagree with the justification. It is not entitled to ignore the
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justification altogether while insisting that the motion is untimely. Because it has done so, the
State's pitch on timeliness misses the mark.
B.

The Motion is Meritorious

As Mr. Pizzuto noted in his Motion, there are two grounds for retracting the previously
entered judgment in light of the Ninth Circuit opinion: 1) the opinion erodes the bases for the
prior state court decisions denying Mr. Pizzuto's claim; and 2) the opinion exposes prior
counsel's negligence and its consequences. See Mot. at 5-12. The State resists both points, but
its objections are insubstantial.
1)

The Ninth Circuit Opinion Undermines the Idaho Supreme Court
Decision

Turning to the first of the two, the State seems to hint at the outset that Mr. Pizzuto falls
short of the Rule 60(b) standard because no Idaho case has previously invoked the provision
under similar circumstances. See Resp. at 18. But that is only because the situation has never
arisen before. To Mr. Pizzuto's knowledge, no Idaho inmate has ever sought to reopen a postconviction proceeding after a declaration by the federal judiciary on habeas review that the state
courts misapplied the science in effect at the time. The State's assumptions notwithstanding, an
absence of precedent does not constitute a prohibition. "Rule 60(b )( 6) is a grand reservoir of
equitable power to do justice in a particular case." Harrell v. DCS Equip. Leasing Corp., 951
F.2d 1453, 1458 (5th Cir. 1992) (quoting Moore's Federal Practice ,r 60.27[2], at 60-295). 3
"The broad language of clause (6) gives the courts ample power to vacate judgments whenever
such action is appropriate to accomplish justice." Id. Such a flexible rule can be employed in a

3

I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) is identical to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6). Federal cases are therefore persuasive
authority on the scope of the latter. See Stewart v. Arrington Constr. Co., 92 Idaho 526, 529
(1968) ("Since our rules of civil procedure are substantially similar to the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, cases construing the federal rules are persuasive.").
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 4
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variety of novel scenarios, no matter whether they happen to have occurred before. Indeed, Rule
60(b)(6) was created precisely for "unique and compelling circumstances." Miller v. Haller, 129
Idaho 345, 349 (1996). It would be perverse to rigidly restrict a rule based on prior precedent
when its very purpose is to cover unique situations.
Finding no success on that formalistic approach, the State moves to the core of the issue:
the relationship between the Ninth Circuit's decision in Mr. Pizzuto's case and the Idaho
Supreme Court's opinion in his 2008 appeal. There, the State begins by belaboring the
unremarkable and undisputed notion that some changes in the law are non-retroactive. See Resp.
at 19-21. The hole in the State's argument is that there is no question ofretroactivity before the
Court. As described in the Motion, Mr. Pizzuto is attempting to reactivate a post-conviction
matter that was rooted in Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), the U.S. Supreme Court
decision that exempted the intellectually disabled from execution. See Mot. at 2. In his appeal
from that proceeding, the Idaho Supreme Court acknowledged that-as a federal constitutional

matter-Atkins "must be applied retroactively" in the post-conviction case. Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at
728 n.4. Stated differently, the Idaho Supreme Court has already determined that Mr. Pizzuto
has a right to vacatur of his death sentence in this case if he is intellectually disabled. The
question in the case today is the same as it was in 2008: is Mr. Pizzuto intellectually disabled?
Since Mr. Pizzuto is plainly deserving of relief if that question is answered affirmatively,
retroactivity is neither here nor there.
Another way of seeing why the State's retroactivity defense is a red herring is to consider
those cases where such a defense does pose a problem. When retroactivity is a bar to a postconviction petition, it is because the type of claim only inures to the benefit of defendants who
were on direct appeal or even earlier in the process at the time the law changed in their favor.
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The State's own cited example is a perfect illustration. See Schriro v. Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348,
3 51 (2004) ("When a decision of this Court results in a new rule, that rule applies to all criminal
cases still pending on direct review. As to convictions that are already final, however, the rule
applies only in limited circumstances."). 4 As mentioned, the Idaho Supreme Court settled in
2008 that Mr. Pizzuto can claim the benefit of the relevant change in the law, i.e., the protection
of the intellectually disabled from capital punishment, even though his conviction was final at
the time of Atkins. Insofar as retroactivity was ever an obstacle to Mr. Pizzuto' s claim, it has
been definitively removed.
In a similar tack, the State mischaracterizes Mr. Pizzuto's motion as having its roots in a
change in decisional law. See, e.g., Resp. at 21 ("[M]erely because the law changed as a result of

Hall and its progeny does not mean there are unique and compelling circumstances that warrant
review under Rule 60(b)(6)."). Such changes are present when appellate courts alter their
position on general legal questions, typically by overruling older authority, and the binding
precedent for everyone in the jurisdiction evolves accordingly. See, e.g., Ramirez v. United

States, 799 F .3d 845, 850-54 (7th Cir. 2015) (discussing a representative example of a Rule
60(b) motion in that category). That is not what happened in the case at bar. Rather, the legal
development that took place was far more significant. Specifically, a federal appellate court in

Mr. Pizzuto 'sown case declared that the state judiciary ran afoul of the clinical standards in
place at the time of its opinion and invited Idaho's judges to revisit their conclusions. See Mot.
at 5-9; see also Pizzuto v. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166, 1183 (9th Cir. 2019) (per curiam) (explaining

4

The State's reference to Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229 (2011), see Resp. at 20, is far
afield. Davis dealt with a line of cases that are all about whether police acted in "good faith"
compliance with then-binding law, 564 U.S. at 245, which has nothing to do with the present
proceeding.
REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 6
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that "the Idaho Supreme Court erred by defining the significantly subaverage intellectual
functioning criterion as an IQ of 70 or below ... and it erred by disregarding ... portions of the
clinical standards" about IQ scores and adaptive deficits). That sort of event-unlike the
overruling of a general precedent-is certainly unique and compelling. As a telling sign of its
uniqueness, the State offers no case in which anything comparable occurred. It follows that even
if changes in decisional law do not always warrant judicial intervention on Rule 60(b) motions,
the much more dramatic history of the case at bar does.
The State strays even further in its examination of Shoop v. Hill, 139 S. Ct. 504 (2019)
(per curiam). In Shoop, the U.S. Supreme Court reversed a grant of Atkins relief because the
Sixth Circuit below drew upon precedent that was not "clearly established at the time" of the
pertinent opinion from the state judiciary. Id. at 506. The "clearly established" test motivating
the Shoop decision is entirely a product of the federal habeas statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), which
the Court cited seventeen times in an eight-page opinion. See id. at 505-09. That statute
instructs federal judges on how to review the decisions of their state peers with the proper level
of deference. See, e.g., Wilson v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 1188, 1191-92 (2018). Section 2254(d) is
not on the table in this state-court matter and Shoop's construction of it does not cut against Mr.
Pizzuto's motion. Cf Long v. Johnson, 736 F.3d 891, 897 (9th Cir. 2013) ("Were we sitting as
the reviewing court on direct appeal, we might have" granted relief, but not in federal habeas).
To the contrary, if Shoop has any impact on the case, it is to strengthen Mr. Pizzuto's
motion. When the Ninth Circuit declined in Mr. Pizzuto's recent appeal to set aside his death
sentence, despite the Idaho Supreme Court's lack of compliance with the clinical standards, it
was because of the same stringent federal habeas statute at issue in Shoop. See Pizzuto, 933 F.3d
at 1183. That is presumably why the Ninth Circuit suggested that further litigation in state court
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might be called for, namely, because such proceedings would not be handicapped by the severe
restrictions of federal habeas law. See id. at 1190. Shoop's utilization of those restrictions only
highlights how sensible the Ninth Circuit's suggestion is.
The State's final salvo on this subject runs into the same barrier. It faults Mr. Pizzuto for
"fail[ing] to recognize [that] the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court's finding that
the post-conviction court could have inferred that Pizzuto's IQ declined between his eighteenth
birthday and when the first IQ test was given" to him. Resp. at 21. The Ninth Circuit did not
"affirm" any such finding. When a federal habeas court refrains from affording relief, it is not
"affirming" anything, in the way an appellate tribunal would when it upholds the decision below.
See Ponnapula v. Spitzer, 297 F .3d 172, 182 (2d Cir. 2002) (rebuffing a proposed rule because it

would "transform[] federal habeas courts into super-appellate state courts"); Wolfs v. Britton, 509
F.2d 304, 308 (8th Cir. 1975) (reiterating, in a habeas case, that "the Federal courts do not sit in
supervisory review of the state courts"). Instead, such a court is simply determining that the high
bar for federal habeas relief has not been met. See Smith v. Spisak, 558 U.S. 139, 149 (2010)
("Whatever the legal merits of the rule or the underlying verdict forms in this case were we to
consider them on direct appeal, the jury instructions at Spisak's trial" did not satisfy the federal
habeas standard).
In its treatment of the IQ-decline question, the Ninth Circuit did no more than that. The
court's holding was only that the Idaho Supreme Court's resolution of the issue was not
"objectively unreasonable under§ 2254(d)(2)." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1188. "[T]hat is a daunting
standard-one that will be satisfied in relatively few cases, especially because" the Ninth Circuit
is "particularly deferential to" its "state-court colleagues." Laher v. Thomas, 825 F.3d 1103,
1112 (9th Cir. 2016). In concluding that the Idaho Supreme Court's handling of a potential IQ
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decline was not "objectively unreasonable," the Ninth Circuit said nothing to intimate that its
handling was correct. See Brumfield v. Cain, 135 S. Ct. 2269, 2277 (2015) ("We may not
characterize these state-court factual determinations as unreasonable" under § 2254(d)(2)
"merely because [we] would have reached a different conclusion in the first instance."). The
Ninth Circuit more or less did the opposite of endorsing the correctness of the Idaho Supreme
Court's finding. It stated: "Even if, as Pizzuto contends, a more reasonable inference would be
that he was substantially drug free and not experiencing seizures after he turned 19, this does not
render the state court's contrary determination objectively unreasonable under§ 2254(d)(2)."

Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1188. In other words, according to the Ninth Circuit, the Idaho Supreme
Court may well have drawn the less reasonable inference.
It is equally important to remember that the Ninth Circuit's exploration of the issue was

confined to the record created in state court. See id. at 1179 ("Because [the Idaho Supreme
Court] denied Pizzuto' s Atkins claim on the merits, our review under § 2254(d) is limited to the
record that was before the state court."). That record was undeveloped, as no evidentiary hearing
was ever conducted in state court and no further testing administered. See id. at 1190. When the
Ninth Circuit deemed the Idaho Supreme Court's findings not objectively unreasonable, it did so
with reference to the fact that one of Mr. Pizzuto's own experts had "requested more testing"
because "those with persistent seizure disorders, like Pizzuto, tend to decline in their mental
abilities over time." Id. at 1188. As elaborated in the Motion and in the next section of this
Reply, the case needs to be reactivated in part because the Ninth Circuit opinion reveals the
negligence of prior counsel in her half-hearted pursuit of additional testing. See Mot. at 9-12;

see also infra at Part I.B.2. The testing has since been done, and it led three qualified experts to
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unanimously opine that Mr. Pizzuto was intellectually disabled before his eighteenth birthday, as
required by the Idaho statute and the Constitution. See Mot. at 13-18.
In overview, the passage upon which the State depends in the Ninth Circuit opinion was a
product of the very deficiencies in prior counsel's performance that militate in favor of reopening
the case. What's more, the passage was tethered to an idea-that Mr. Pizzuto's IQ fell after he
reached adulthood-which he has now dispelled with evidence before this Court, or at least
sufficiently called into question to secure a hearing.
The State's perspective is inconsistent with the Ninth Circuit opinion in a final, more
straightforward respect. Had the Ninth Circuit felt that the Idaho Supreme Court's resolution of
the declining-IQ issue was beyond reproach, there would have been no sense in proposing
further state-court proceedings, which it went out of its way to do. See Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at
1190. Evidently, the Ninth Circuit believed that the pervasive conflict between the Idaho
Supreme Court's opinion and the then-existing medical consensus was enough to merit
additional litigation here. Its belief was well-founded. This Court has the ability now to look at
the entire case with fresh eyes, freed from both the previous misconceptions about the science
and the restraints of federal habeas review. When it does so, it can inquire in the first instance
and on the most comprehensive record into the possibility of a drop in IQ scores, along with all
of the other serious issues raised by these I.R.C.P. 60(b) proceedings.
2)

The Ninth Circuit Opinion Reveals Prior Counsel's Negligence

As articulated in his Motion, Mr. Pizzuto' s second ground for reactivating the case flows
from the serious missteps made by his prior attorney in these post-conviction proceedings, which
were then exposed by the Ninth Circuit's opinion. See Mot. at 9-12. Most devastatingly, prior
counsel moved to have Mr. Pizzuto tested but failed to notice the motion for a hearing, resulting

REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 10
Page 713

in a finding by the Ninth Circuit that she inadequately pursued factual development on her claim.
See id.

In countering this ground, the State blunders, preliminarily, by misconstruing the
governing standard oflaw. To the State's mind, Rule 60(b) only supplies a vehicle for
contesting a post-conviction attorney's performance when she engaged in "years of shocking and
disgraceful neglect." Resp. at 26. The State pulls that language from the seminal case of Eby v.
State, 148 Idaho 731, 732 (2010). It is true that Eby involved such conduct. Still, it is not true

that the Idaho Supreme Court made it necessary for relief in every case. The question posed by
Eby was whether "neglect by post-conviction relief counsel" can constitute "grounds upon which

relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) may be granted[.]" Id. at 736. Eby said yes, see id. at 736-38, and
that is the holding of the case.

When Eby is viewed in context, Mr. Pizzuto easily qualifies for relief under it. In
lobbying for the inverse conclusion, the State unsurprisingly zeroes in on the tasks that prior
counsel did accomplish. See Resp. at 27-28. Nonetheless, because the issue here is what
counsel did to secure testing, the proper inquiry is into what tasks she accomplished to further
that goal. With the question framed thusly, the answer becomes plain: effectively nothing.

Counsel filed a motion for testing and then did not notice it for hearing or apparently pursue it in
any other fashion. The watchword of Eby is "inactivity," a term the opinion uses no fewer than
seven times. 148 Idaho at 732-34. In regards to the issue of testing-the only issue that
matters-counsel's performance was the epitome of inactivity.
Later, the State unsuccessfully attempts to draw another categorical line between Eby and
Mr. Pizzuto's case, insisting that the former only applies to an initial post-conviction petition and
no subsequent ones. See Resp. at 28. For support, the State looks to Parvin and Lopez, though
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they are not on point. Those decisions were both written to inform post-conviction litigants that,
when they are dissatisfied with the services of their attorneys, their only venue is to seek Rule
60(b) relief rather than file a new petition. See Parvin, 157 Idaho at 521; Lopez, 157 Idaho at
798. In issuing its directives in Parvin and Lopez, the court alluded to initial post-conviction
proceedings because those were the proceedings in which counsel happened to have taken the
actions the petitioners were unhappy with, so those were the proceedings in which the I.R.C.P.
60(b) motion had to be submitted. See Parvin, 157 Idaho at 518-20; Lopez, 157 Idaho at 796.
That the initial post-conviction proceedings were the pertinent ones in Parvin and Lopez as a
matter of happenstance does not mean that they always are. No Idaho appellate court has ever
purported to limit Eby in that fashion. As observed earlier, the holding of Eby is that "neglect by
post-conviction relief counsel" is "grounds upon which relief under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) may be
granted[.]" 148 Idaho at 736. By its plain terms, that applies to second petitions as much as it
does to first petitions, and there is no basis for the Court to hold otherwise.
Even if the State's distinction were sound, it would not cut against Mr. Pizzuto's motion.
Granted, the petition at issue in these proceedings might be labeled "successive" as a shorthand
to reflect that there were others that preceded it. Be that as it may, the petition is not successive
in any sense that would deprive Mr. Pizzuto of his Rule 60(b) rights, even under the State's
warped reading of Eby. The U.S. Supreme Court first declared the execution of the intellectually
disabled to be unconstitutional in Atkins, which was decided in 2002. See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at
726. Mr. Pizzuto's Atkins petition, which initiated the instant proceeding, was submitted the
following year and was deemed timely by the Idaho Supreme Court. See id. at 726-27. That
petition was the first one filed by Mr. Pizzuto alleging intellectual disability as a ground for
vacating his death sentence. See id. at 722-24. Consequently, this case is most accurately
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conceived of as a first post-conviction proceeding, at least as it concerns the Atkins issue. See

Panetti v. Quarterman, 551 U.S. 930, 942--47 (2007) (concluding that a second habeas petition
raising a newly ripened claim was not successive within the meaning of federal habeas law). If
there were some rule that Eby has no bearing on second petitions, it would presumably be on the
reasoning that the petitioner could have raised the claim in his first petition. But Mr. Pizzuto
could not have asserted the claim in his earlier petitions, as Atkins had not yet been issued.
Taking the State's Response on its own terms, it is still unpersuasive.
Shorn of these categorical arguments, the State proffers a trio of decisions by the Idaho
Court of Appeals to bolster its assertion that Rule 60(b) relief is unmerited under the particular
circumstances of the case at hand. See Resp. at 27. All of the cases are distinguishable, both
collectively and individually.
On the collective front, the most salient fact about the cases is that none of them involved
death sentences. See Devan v. State, 162 Idaho 520 (Ct. App. 2017); Dixon v. State, 157 Idaho
582 (Ct. App. 2014); Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696 (Ct. App. 2015). The U.S. Supreme Court
announced many years ago that because "execution is the most irremediable and unfathomable
of penalties," "death is different." Ford v. Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399, 411 (1986). Death being
different, capital cases demand "a correspondingly greater degree of scrutiny." California v.

Ramos, 463 U.S. 992, 998-99 (1983). That higher level of scrutiny extends to capital defense
lawyers' work, as their clients' lives depend upon how they discharge their duties. See Frierson

v. Woodford, 463 F.3d 982, 993 (9th Cir. 2006). And it extends beyond the trial itself, for even
on appeal (and by the same token, in post-conviction), the consequences of defense counsel's
omissions remain potentially fatal. See Jamison v. Collins, 100 F. Supp. 2d 647, 740 (S.D. Ohio
2000), aff'd, 291 F.3d 380 (6th Cir. 2002) (stating that in a capital appeal, unlike a non-capital
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one, "any winnowing or narrowing of issues must be done very cautiously when a person's life is
at stake"). The Court of Appeals' decisions emphasized by the State did not grapple with those
heavy stakes. They are therefore of limited value in assessing the errors of Mr. Pizzuto' s prior
post-conviction counsel.
In the event the Court looks beyond that fundamental difference, the State's cases remain
inapposite. In Devan, post-conviction counsel resolved after due study and reflection that there
was "no meritorious claim" to advocate for. 162 Idaho at 523. By contrast, Mr. Pizzuto's prior
attorney obviously felt her claim was a winning one, and simply exercised poor judgment in how
she developed it. See Mot. at 9-12. In that sense, the Devan lawyer acted in the reasonable,
deliberative fashion that is the most any defendant can expect, while Mr. Pizzuto' s did not. As
for Dixon and Bias, there is no indication in those opinions as to why the attorney's omissions
occurred. Here, counsel's reasoning is undisputed, and it was patently illogical. Namely, Mr.
Pizzuto' s previous post-conviction counsel never noticed her motion for hearing because she
regarded "any order entered by the court on the question of testing" as "void," Pizzuto, 933 F.3d
at 1173 n.2, a line of reasoning that simply made no sense, see Mot. at 10-12.
In a last-ditch maneuver, the State tepidly defends the wisdom of prior counsel's
decisions. Recall that Mr. Pizzuto is now questioning his previous attorney for failing to notice
for hearing her motion for testing on the thinking that any ruling on the matter by Judge
Reinhardt was void, since her request for his disqualification was pending. See Mot. at 9-12.
The State perfunctorily judges counsel's reasoning valid. See Resp. at 28. Tellingly, though, the
State has nothing to say about how counsel's reasoning does not even explain the attorney's
conduct, for she never noticed the motion for hearing even after the disqualification issue was no

longer pending. See Mot. at 10. Letting a key motion languish in limbo for six months while a
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case is decided against you is virtually the definition of "inactivity," which is enough to justify a
reopening of the case on its own. See Eby, 148 Idaho at 732-34.
Partly, the State's championing of prior counsel flows from its confusion over which part
of her reasoning is currently at issue. The State posits that "the Idaho Supreme Court did not
consider [her] arguments to be far- fetched or even without merit, either with respect to the
automatic or cause motions for disqualification." Resp. at 28. It seems the State has in mind
prior counsel's arguments about why Judge Reinhardt should have been removed from the case,
as those were the arguments the Idaho Supreme Court took up. See Pizzuto, 146 Idaho at 72426. However, that is not the theory that made prior counsel's approach defective. It was,
instead, the theory that any order Judge Reinhardt rendered on the motion for testing would be
illegitimate while the disqualification issue was in play. For, as mentioned, it is that latter theory
that animated counsel's decision not to notice her motion for hearing, and it is that decision that
Mr. Pizzuto targets in these Rule 60(b) proceedings. And on that theory, which Mr. Pizzuto has
revealed in detail to be exceedingly tenuous, see Mot. at 9-12, the State is notably silent. As a
consequence, the State supplies no reason for the Court to absolve prior counsel of her miscues.
The State touts prior counsel's gambit as a creative ploy that showed her aggressiveness,
in line with the professional guidelines for capital defense lawyers. See Resp. at 28. There is no
doubt that capital defense attorneys have a responsibility to push any colorable argument, even if
it has not yet been embraced by controlling precedent. That said, they do not thereby gain a
license to forfeit the more promising, more conventional arguments that might benefit their
clients. To the contrary, the purpose of inventive, comprehensive litigation is to preserve as
many potentially meritorious issues as possible. See American Bar Association: Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases, reprinted at 31
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Hofstra L. Rev. 913, 103 0 (2003) ("One of the most fundamental duties of an attorney defending
a capital case at trial is the preservation of any and all conceivable errors for each stage of
appellate and post-conviction review."); see also Martinez v. Ryan, 566 U.S. 1, 12 (2012)
("Effective trial counsel preserves claims to be considered on appeal."). Prior counsel could
easily have preserved her ability to make the unorthodox argument about Judge Reinhardt
lacking authority to rule on her motion while likewise preserving the far more important ability
to argue to future courts that she had exhaustively developed the facts supporting her Atkins
claim. All she needed to do was make the second argument in the alternative to the first,
something lawyers do every day in courts around the country. See, e.g., State v. Abdullah, 158
Idaho 386, 482 (2015) (mentioning that counsel for a capital post-conviction petitioner made an
argument in the alternative); State v. Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 558 (2008) (same).
Lastly, the State asks that prior counsel's botched handling of the motion for testing be
forgiven on the ground that she made her own request for summary judgment and averred there
that "no genuine issues of material fact" precluded a ruling in her favor on the papers, thereby
making the testing question "moot." Resp. at 29. Again, though, this conception of counsel's
thought process only holds water if an attorney can never make alternative arguments and is
instead always forced to place all of her eggs in one basket. That is not the reality. There was
nothing preventing counsel from alleging that she had proven her case on the papers and
simultaneously noticing her motion for testing for a hearing in the event the Court disagreed. A
careful capital defense lawyer would have done just that. Prior counsel's negligence in not
taking these obvious precautions warrants additional proceedings now, so the evidence that was
wrongly obstructed last time can finally be aired in state court for the first time.
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C.

An Evidentiary Hearing is Necessary

As recited in the Motion, once the case is reopened under Rule 60(b), an evidentiary
hearing is mandated pursuant to both Idaho post-conviction law and the Constitution. See Mot.
at 12-20. Looking for a way to free itself from the burden of this mandatory hearing, the State
professes that it is barred by res judicata because the same issue has supposedly already been
adjudicated in federal court. See Resp. at 29-33. The State misapprehends both the posture of
the case and the nature of res judicata.
The Court need not delve into the individual res judicata factors, because the doctrine is
completely irreconcilable with the unusual facts presented here. As the State correctly remarks,
the foremost purpose of res judicata is to "preserve[] the acceptability of judicial dispute
resolution against the corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results." Id. at 30 (quoting Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119,
123 (2007)). The "disrespect" that res judicata is meant to discourage is towards the original
court that first rendered a decision on the matter. See Crown v. Klein Bros., 121 Idaho 942, 949
(Ct. App. 1991) (applying resjudicata because the challenged "litigation could lead to a
judgment that is inconsistent with" an earlier court order); see also Quincy Mall, Inc. v. Parisian,
Inc., 27 F. App'x 631,640 (7th Cir. 2001) (per curiam) (similar). In the case at hand, the earlier

decision that res judicata would shield from disrespect would of course be the judgment of the
federal courts. Yet the decisive opinion from the federal courts on the matter explicitly clarifies
that it "does not preclude the Idaho courts from reconsidering" Mr. Pizzuto's intellectual
disability. Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1190. In effect, the State is asking the Court to hold that it must
stay away from an issue out of deference to the federal judiciary when the federal judiciary itself
has invited the Court to address that very issue. That turns the entire philosophy of res judicata
on its head.
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Should the Court nevertheless proceed to the specific res judicata criteria, they do not
support a different outcome. Whether viewed in terms of issue preclusion or claim preclusion,
res judicata is only present when there was a final judgment in the prior case. See Resp. at 30 &
sources cited therein. Here, there was not.
A judgment becomes final for res judicata purposes in Idaho when the losing party has
exhausted-or has had an opportunity to exhaust-his appellate remedies. See Smith v. Smith,
164 Idaho 46, 51 (2018). In jurisdictions taking that approach, a federal order acquires no res
judicata power until certiorari proceedings have concluded at the U.S. Supreme Court or the time
for commencing them have passed. See Silver v. Queen's Hosp., 629 P.2d 1116, 1124 (Haw.
1981 ). Mr. Pizzuto' s federal appeal remains pending. See Ex. 1. He has not yet filed a petition
for panel and en bane rehearing, a right that is guaranteed to him by rule, see Fed. R. App. P. 35,
40, and one that he will be taking advantage of, see Ex. 1. In the event relief remains
unforthcoming after rehearing proceedings, Mr. Pizzuto will seek certiorari review at the U.S.
Supreme Court, see id., which he is also entitled to do, see 28 U.S.C. §§ 1254, 2101(c). Until all
of those proceedings are completed, the federal district court's order is not final, and res judicata
does not attach to it.
Furthermore, by training its attention on the federal district court's order, the State loses
sight of the operative opinion. For the district court's order has now been superseded by the
Ninth Circuit's opinion, which has become the authoritative statement on Mr. Pizzuto' s habeas
case from the federal judiciary. And in that authoritative statement, the Ninth Circuit stressed
that it was "not address[ing]" the question presented here, i.e., "whether Pizzuto is intellectually
disabled" or "whether his execution would violate the Eighth Amendment," because the federal
habeas statute precluded any review of it. Pizzuto, 933 F .3d at 1171. In that regard, the issue
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under review now is not the issue that was resolved in federal court, as required by res judicata,
since the ruling that answered the question has been supplanted by a ruling that did not.
It is especially inappropriate for the State to rely for res judicata on the findings the
federal district court made after its evidentiary hearing. See Resp. at 32. The Ninth Circuit
denied habeas relief because it was "barred under§ 2254(d)." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1171. When
§ 2254(d) forecloses habeas relief, an evidentiary hearing in federal court is categorically
forbidden. See, e.g., Murray v. Schriro, 882 F.3d 778, 822 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 414
(2018). Under the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mr. Pizzuto' s appeal, then, the evidentiary hearing
below should never have occurred, nor the findings that grew out of it. Far from enjoying res
judicata status, those findings have become a legal nullity.
The State's chief authority on how res judicata operates in the post-conviction setting-

State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1 (1998)-does not help its cause. For the two features of the present
case that render res judicata irrelevant here were both absent there. Most importantly, the federal
courts in Creech had not called for further state proceedings on the very issue potentially barred
by res judicata. See Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463 (1993); Creech v. Arave, 947 F.2d 873 (9th
Cir. 1991 ). As discussed, that is the most significant factor cutting against res judicata in this
case. Nor was there any question in Creech about the finality of the federal judgment. In that
case, the federal proceedings concluded in March 1993 with the U.S. Supreme Court's decision.

See Creech, 507 U.S. 463. The issues that were later found barred by res judicata began arising
in April 1994. See Creech, 132 Idaho at 6. Unlike this case, there was no argument to be made
in Creech that the federal judgment with supposedly res judicata effect had not yet become final.
The Creech decision did not address the argument, or foreclose it, and it is dispositive here.
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Finally, Mr. Pizzuto established in his Motion that he has a constitutional entitlement to
an evidentiary hearing under Brumfield. See Mot. at 18-19. In the State's view, the Court can
ignore Brumfield because it dealt with some questions of federal habeas procedure that are not
germane here. See Resp. at 33. Much as it might desire to be rid of the precedents it dislikes, the
State cannot plausibly limit Brumfield so severely. Brumfield remanded for an evidentiary
hearing because it was "unconstitutional" for the state court "to foreclose all further exploration
of intellectual disability" by summarily deciding that the inmate was not intellectually disabled
without affording him an opportunity to present live testimony. 135 S. Ct. at 2278. If the U.S.
Supreme Court deems something unconstitutional, it is unconstitutional-period. The standard
of review that happened to be at issue in Brumfield is neither here nor there.
Brumfield's plain language is consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Mr. Pizzuto's

case. In proposing further proceedings here, the Ninth Circuit stressed that when "the Idaho
courts rejected Pizzuto's Atkins claim in 2008, they did so without the benefit of an evidentiary
hearing," and "without the benefit of ... Brumfield," and that it had since been made clear by
Brumfield that "it is unconstitutional to foreclose all further exploration of intellectual disability"

based only on an above-70 IQ score. Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1190. If the Attorney General were
correct that Brumfield is meaningless in these proceedings, there would have been no reason for
the Ninth Circuit to suggest that the state courts consider the opinion now when they revisit their
summary denial of Mr. Pizzuto's claim.
Opposing counsel's reading of Brumfield is also at odds with the reception the case has
had in other state court systems. Those courts perceive Brumfield as giving them their marching
orders on when the Constitution compels an evidentiary hearing for claims of intellectual
disability. See Commonwealth v. Cox, 204 A.3d 371, 388 (Pa. 2019) (remanding for
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consideration of the evidence under several new authorities, including Brumfield, and observing
that that opinion "disapproved an analysis that factored an individual's adaptive strengths to
preclude a hearing on the existence of adaptive deficits"); Foster v. State, 260 So. 3d 174, 181
(Fla. 2018) (per curiam) (granting an evidentiary hearing because the petitioner "must now be
afforded an opportunity to present evidence of intellectual disability" and citing, inter alia,
Brumfield); Walls v. State, 213 So. 3d 340, 346--47 (Fla. 2016) (per curiam) (finding that even
though the defendant "had an earlier evidentiary hearing as to intellectual disability," "he did not
receive the type of holistic review to which he is now entitled" under Brumfield and other new
precedents).
In short, other state courts have taken Brumfield' s unequivocal language at face value and
seen in it a roadmap to determining when an evidentiary hearing on intellectual disability is
constitutionally required. This Court should too, and when it does the need for an evidentiary
hearing here becomes undeniable.
II.

Conclusion
The State is comfortable executing a man even though a panel of federal judges

unanimously declared that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision rejecting his Atkins claim
contravened the scientific norms. Mr. Pizzuto is confident the Court will not share the State's
nonchalance about the risk of killing an intellectually disabled defendant in violation of the
Eighth Amendment. To prevent that miscarriage of justice from occurring, the Court should
make use of every available safeguard. Here, that means granting the motion to alter or amend,
vacating the 2005 order denying relief, allowing Mr. Pizzuto an opportunity to request leave to
amend his petition, and setting an evidentiary hearing. Mr. Pizzuto respectfully requests that the
Court take those modest steps to ensure he is not executed unconstitutionally.
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DATED this 14th day of November 2019.
/s/ Jonah J. Horwitz
Jonah J. Horwitz
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 14th day ofNovember 2019, I served the foregoing document
on all interested parties, who are set forth below, via iCourt file and serve:
L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Statehouse Mail, Room 10
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

/s/ Julie Hill
Julie Hill
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DECLARATION OF JONAH J. HORWITZ

I, Jonah J. Horwitz, declare as follows:
1.

I am an attorney in the Capital Habeas Unit ("CHU") for the Federal Defender
Services of Idaho.

2.

In this state post-conviction action, I am counsel of record for Petitioner Gerald
Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

3.

I am co-counsel for Mr. Pizzuto in the federal habeas appeal currently pending in
the Ninth Circuit. My colleague Bruce D. Livingston is lead counsel.

4.

In the Ninth Circuit appeal, the current deadline for a petition for panel and en
bane rehearing, as set by the court's order, is November 27, 2019. We will be
filing a petition for rehearing on Mr. Pizzuto' s behalf.

5.

If Mr. Pizzuto does not obtain satisfactory relief from the Ninth Circuit in

rehearing proceedings, we will seek certiorari review for him from the U.S.
Supreme Court.
6.

I declare under penalty of perjury pursuant to the law of the State of Idaho that the
foregoing is true and correct.

/s/ Jonah J. Horwitz
Jonah J. Horwitz

November 14, 2019
(Date)
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT

OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
vs.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
Respondent.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION TO ALTER OR
AMEND JUDGMENT

COMES NOW, Respondent, State ofldaho ("state"), by and through its attorney,
L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital Litigation Unit and Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, and hereby responds to Petitioner's ("Pizzuto")
Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment ("Motion") and supporting brief ("Brief').
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BACKGROUND
The facts leading to the 1985 brutal and vicious murders of Berta Herndon and her
nephew, Delbert Herndon that resulted in Pizzuto' s convictions and death sentences were
initially summarized by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Pizzuto (Pizzuto It 119 Idaho
742, 748-49, 810 p.2d (1991), and more recently in Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto IV). 146 Idaho
720, 723, 202 P.3d 642 (2008), as follows:
On July 25, 1985, the petitioner Gerald R. Pizzuto, Jr., (Pizzuto)
murdered two innocent strangers, Berta Herndon and her nephew Del
Herndon. Pizzuto approached them with a .22 caliber rifle as they arrived
at their mountain cabin and made them enter the cabin. While inside, he
tied the Herdons' [sic] wrists behind their backs and bound their legs in
order to steal their money. Some time later, he bludgeoned Berta Herndon
to death with hammer blows to her head and killed Del Herndon by
bludgeoning him in the head with a hammer and shooting him between the
eyes. Pizzuto murdered the Herdons [sic] just for the sake of killing and
subsequently joked and bragged about the killings to his associates.
Pizzuto was convicted of two counts of first-degree murder, and one count of
robbery and grand theft. Id. The Ninth Circuit summarized the evidence from Pizzuto's
sentencing hearing:
Pizzuto called his two sisters, Toni and Angelinna Pizzuto, and his aunt,
Kibby Winslow, who described the abuse he (and his sisters) suffered in
childhood; his former probation officer from Great Falls, Montana, Jerome
Skiba, who gave a positive report on Pizzuto' s adjustment; and Dr.
[Michael] Emery. Pizzuto did not testify but made an unsworn statement to
the court. The state presented eight witnesses, including Pizzuto' s former
wife, Pamela Relken, who testified that Pizzuto could be "very violent,
punishing" in that he had pushed her head into a wall, drowned her cats and
their puppy (who Pizzuto then hung from the shower stall), pushed her down
the stairs when she was six-and-a-half months pregnant, pointed a gun at
her head and played roulette, described himself "as a fourth generation Al
Capone," and threatened her with death in a letter written after he had been
arrested on rape charges. It also called Michael Berro, the presentence
investigator on Pizzuto' s Michigan rape conviction, who testified that
Pizzuto was "one of two people who have ever threatened [his] life where
[he] believed it"; Paul Blumbaum, who worked at Pizzuto' s jail and testified
that Pizzuto claimed to have put snakes in mail-boxes, said that he could
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"get anything out of anybody he wanted by the technique of tying them
tightly around the ankles," and threatened his jailers by saying that he was
going to bring in the Mafia; Annette Jones, who authored the presentence
report for the Herndon case; Berta Hemdon's widower; and Dr. Emery.
Pizzuto v. Arave, 280 F.3d 949, 953-54 (9 th Cir. 2002), dissent amended and superseded

in part by, 385 F.3d 1247 (9 th Cir. 2004).
After taking the matter under advisement, the district court concluded the state had
proven five statutory aggravating factors, including: ( 1) at the time Pizzuto murdered Del,
he also murdered Berta; (2) the murders were especially heinous, atrocious, cruel and
manifested exceptional depravity; (3) by the murders and circumstances surrounding their
commission, Pizzuto exhibited utter disregard for human life; (4) the murders were
accompanied with the specific intent to cause the deaths of the Hemdons; and (5) by prior
conduct and by conduct in the murders, Pizzuto had exhibited a propensity to commit
murder which will probably constitute a continuing threat to society. Pizzuto I, 119 Idaho
at 770. The court ultimately sentenced Pizzuto to death for both murders, fixed life for
robbery, and a fixed fourteen years for grand theft. Id. at 749.
As required by LC.§ 19-2719, Pizzuto filed his first post-conviction petition raising
fourteen claims, which the post-conviction court denied. Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto III). 134
Idaho 793, 794-95, 10 P.3d 742 (2000). In a consolidated appeal, with the exception of the
robbery conviction and sentence which the court concluded was a lesser included offense
of felony-murder, the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed Pizzuto' s convictions and sentences.
Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 723; see generally Pizzuto I, supra. 1

In 1987, Pizzuto was also found guilty of two other murders in the State of Washington
that he committed in 1985. See State v. Pizzuto, 778 P.2d 42 (Wash. Ct. App. 1989).
1
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In 1992, Pizzuto filed his first federal habeas petition. Pizzuto, 280 F .3d at 954.
While his federal petition was pending, Pizzuto filed his second post-conviction petition in
1994, which the post-conviction court dismissed pursuant to LC. § 19-2719 because the
claims were known or reasonably could have been known at the time he filed his first postconviction petition. Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto II), 127 Idaho 469, 470, 903 P.2d 58 (1995).
Pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, the state filed a motion to dismiss Pizzuto's appeal, which the
Idaho Supreme Court granted. See generally Pizzuto IL
In 1997, the federal district court denied Pizzuto's habeas claims. Pizzuto, 280 F.3d
at 954. While his habeas appeal was pending, Pizzuto filed his third post-conviction
petition in 1998, which the post-conviction court dismissed because the claims were known
or reasonably could have been known when the earlier post-conviction petitions were filed.
Pizzuto III, 134 Idaho at 795. Based upon LC. §19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court
affirmed. See generally Pizzuto III. As a result of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002),
Pizzuto filed a fourth post-conviction petition in 2002, which was dismissed by the postconviction court. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 723. The Idaho Supreme Court dismissed
Pizzuto' s appeal because Ring does not apply retroactively. Id. 2
In 2002, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of federal habeas relief.

See

generally Pizzuto, 280 F.3d 949. Pizzuto's Petition for Rehearing and Suggestion for

Rehearing En Banc was denied 2005, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari. Pizzuto v.
Fisher, 546 U.S. 976 (2005).

2

In light of Danforth v. Minnesota, 552 U.S. 264 (2008), the Supreme Court vacated and
remanded the dismissal of Pizzuto's Ring appeal. Pizzuto v. Idaho, 552 U.S. 1227 (2008).
Upon remand, Pizzuto' s appeal was consolidated with several others, and the Idaho
Supreme Court affirmed the post-conviction court, concluding that Ring is not retroactive
under Idaho law. Rhoades et al. v. State, 149 Idaho 130, 233 P.3d 61 (2010).
RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 4
Page 731

While Pizzuto's Ninth Circuit appeal was still pending, the Supreme Court issued
Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304 (2002), concluding the execution of intellectually disabled
("ID") murderers violates the Eighth Amendment. 3

While concluding there was a

"national consensus" that had developed against executing ID murderers, id. at 316, the
Court recognized that any "serious disagreement about the execution of mentally retarded
offenders" stems from "which offenders are in fact retarded," and "[n]ot all people who
claim to be mentally retarded will be so impaired as to fall within the range of mentally
retarded offenders about whom there is a national consensus," id. at 317. Although the
Court referenced two clinical definitions for ID and noted that, while statutory definitions
are not identical, they "generally conform to the clinical definitions," id. at 317 n.22, the
Court declined to adopt a rigid test defining the parameters ofID, reasoning, '"we leave to
the State[ s] the task of developing appropriate ways to enforce the constitutional restriction
upon [their] execution of sentences,"' id. at 317 (brackets in original) (quoting Ford v.
Wainwright, 477 U.S. 399,405 (1986)).
Responding to the Supreme Court's edict, the Idaho Legislature enacted LC. § 192515A, prohibiting the execution of ID murderers and establishing substantive and
procedural requirements that must be met and followed to prove an ID claim in Idaho.
2003 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch. 136 §§ 4 & 6, p.398.
Pizzuto filed a fifth post-conviction petition in his current case on June 19, 2003,
contending he is ID under the dictates of Atkins, 536 U.S. 304. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at

At that time, "intellectual disability" was known as "mental retardation." Because the
courts and authorities now use the term "intellectual disability," Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S.
701, 704 (2014), that is the phrase the state will use except when quoting material that
expressly uses the phrase, "mental retardation."
3
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723. The state filed a Motion for Summary Dismissal, asserting the petition was not timely
after issuance of Atkins, and that the petition sought retroactive application of Atkins, in
violation ofl.C. § 19-2719. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 723. On September 23, 2005, Pizzuto
filed a Motion for Summary Judgment. Id. The post-conviction court summarily dismissed
Pizzuto' s petition, concluding it was not timely filed and that he failed to raise a genuine
issue of material fact supporting his ID claim. Id.
Addressing the merits of Pizzuto' s ID claim, the Idaho Supreme Court concluded
he failed to present sufficient evidence establishing he had an IQ of 70 or below before his
eighteenth birthday; the court did not address whether Pizzuto established the second prong
ofl.C. § 19-2515A- significant limitations in adaptive functioning. Id. at 723-33.
While his Atkins post-conviction petition was pending, Pizzuto filed a request with
the Ninth Circuit to file another successive habeas petition based upon the contention that
he was ID, which the court granted, resulting in Pizzuto filing a successive habeas petition
on December 19, 2005. 4 Pizzuto v. Blades, 2012 WL 73236, *3 (D. Idaho 2012); (see also
Affidavit of L. LaMont Anderson ("Affidavit"), Exhibit C).

At Pizzuto's request,

additional psychological testing was completed by Dr. Ricardo Weinstein in January 2009
that included the WAIS-IV IQ test where Pizzuto scored 61 on verbal comprehension, 67
on perceptual reasoning, 80 on working memory, 56 on full processing speed, and a full-

Pizzuto also filed other requests with the Ninth Circuit to file successive habeas petitions.
One such request was denied on March 8, 2012. Pizzuto v. Blades, 673 F.3d 1003 (9 th Cir.
2012). He also filed post-judgment motions in federal court, which were denied by the
district court and affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. Pizzuto v. Ramirez, 783 F.3d 1171 (9 th
Cir. 2015). Pizzuto also filed a sixth post-conviction petition in 2005, which was
summarily dismissed pursuant to LC. § 19-2719, and the Idaho Supreme Court affirmed.
Pizzuto v. State (Pizzuto V), 149 Idaho 155, 233 P.3d 86 (2010).

4

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 6
Page 733

scale score of 60. (Brief, Exhibit 2, pp.4, 12.) Pizzuto also provided reports from Drs.
James R. Patton (Brief, Exhibit 3) and James Merikangas (Brief, Exhibit 4).
In preparation for an evidentiary hearing, the state obtained records from Dr. Craig
Beaver revealing that in 1996, he completed a neuropsychological examination with
Pizzuto that included IQ testing establishing that Pizzuto had a verbal IQ score of 91, a
performance IQ score of 94, and a full scale IQ score of 92. (Affidavit, Exhibit B, p.1.)
The state also proffered a report and two addendums from Dr. Roger Moore explaining
Pizzuto was not intellectually disabled. (Affidavit, Exhibits D, E, F.) The state also relied
upon evidence and testimony from Dr. Michael Emery, a licensed psychologist, who
examined Pizzuto prior to trial and used several psychological tests, including the WAISR Verbal Scale IQ test that Dr. Emery concluded established Pizzuto' s verbal IQ was 72,
"which falls in the borderline range of intellectual deficiency and probably reflects, at least
to some extent, a history that has included little organization, predictability, or formal
learning." (Affidavit, Exhibit A.) However, Pizzuto's other tests "suggest[ed] somewhat
higher intellectual potential." (Id.) At Pizzuto's sentencing hearing, while Dr. Emery
opined Pizzuto had borderline intellectual deficiency based upon the score of 72 on the
WAIS-R (Sent. Tr., p.147), he qualified his diagnosis, stating:
[Pizzuto] showed more intelligence in his conversations, his choice of
words, and very frequently individuals who come out of a background
similar to that of Mr. Pizzuto's, with the intellectual interchange, the testing
would be spuriously low especially on the verbal scale. In fact, it reflects
items such as what factual items were learned in school and that's the place
where he did the least effective. So, I guess his native intelligence is
probably a little higher than that and the limitations we see are a reflection
of the circumstances he grew up in.
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(Id., p.180.) 5
After an evidentiary hearing (Affidavit, Exhibits G, H, I, J), the federal district court
initially denied habeas relief under the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act
("AEDPA"), concluding the Idaho Supreme Court's decision was not contrary to, or an
unreasonable application of Atkins, or based upon an unreasonable determination of the
facts from the evidence presented to the state's courts. Pizzuto, 2012 WL 73236 at *4-13.
Reviewing the evidence presented at the evidentiary hearing, the court also denied
habeas relief under de nova review, concluding Pizzuto failed to establish his IQ was
significantly subaverage (meaning an IQ of70 or below) prior to age 18, id. at *13-16; the
court concluded Pizzuto met his burden of establishing significant limitations in adaptive
functioning, id. at 16-21. Explaining its rationale regarding Pizzuto's IQ score, the court
addressed each of the three IQ scores that were presented during the hearing: (1) the 1985
verbal score of 72 on the WAIS-R given by Dr. Emery; (2) the 1996 full scale IQ score of
92 on the WAIS-R given ordered Dr. Beaver; and (3) the 2009 full scale IQ score of60 on
the WAIS-IV given by Dr. Weinstein. Id. at 13-16.
Of the three scores, the court gave the score from Dr. Weinstein's 2009 testing "the
least weight" because the test was given 35 years after Pizzuto' s eighteenth birthday and
"Pizzuto' s advanced cardiovascular disease could have contributed to an overall decline in
his mental ability." Id. at *14. While the court did not entirely discount the 1985 score
since it provided "some data on the issue," the court found "the score to be a low estimation
of Pizzuto' s full intellectual functioning before he turned 18" since "Dr. Emery did not

With the filing of this response, the state is filing a Motion to Take Judicial Notice asking
this Court to judicially notice the transcript from Pizzuto' s sentencing hearing.

5
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record a full scale score and has since disposed of his raw data" and "Pizzuto' s drug use
and other neurological problems may have affected his cognitive functioning at the time."
Id. at 14-15. Addressing the 1996 Beaver scores, and giving Pizzuto the benefit of the
doubt, the court granted an "adjustment" based upon the "Flynn Effect," which would have
dropped the numerical range between 82 and 92. Id. at 15. However, the court recognized
that "still did not get him close to the threshold for significantly subaverage general
intellectual functioning." Id. The court ultimately concluded "that Pizzuto's intellectual
functioning was likely higher than the Emery verbal score of 72 indicates but lower than
the Beaver full scale score of92." Id. at 16. While recognizing this placed the score "most
likely somewhere in the 80's," the court declined to "determine a precise numerical score,"
concluding "that Pizzuto has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his general
intellectual functioning at the relevant time was significantly subaverage; that is, that he
had an IQ of 70 or below." Id. The court also denied Pizzuto's Motion to Alter or Amend
under Rule 59(e). Pizzuto v. Blades, 2012 WL 1189908 (D. Idaho 2012).
The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision based upon AEDPA
deference. Pizzuto v. Blades, 729 F.3d 1211 (9 th Cir. 2013). Because Pizzuto failed to
meet his burden under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the Circuit declined to address the district
court's factual findings from the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1224 n.5. However, because
Hall v. Florida, 572 U.S. 701 (2014) was issued after the Ninth Circuit's decision was filed,
the Circuit withdrew its opinion, vacated the district court's order, and remanded for further
proceedings consistent with Hall. Pizzuto v. Blades, 758 F.3d 1178 (9 th Cir. 2014).
On remand, the district court gleaned three main points from Hall: (1) "subaverage
intellectual functioning-the first prong of the intellectual disability analysis-can be
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established by evidence of an IQ score, and an IQ score of 70 or below will satisfy that
prong"; (2) "an IQ score of 76 or higher means that the individual does not suffer from
significantly subaverage intellectual functioning and, therefore, is not entitled to relief
under Atkins"; and (3) "petitioners with IQ scores of 71 to 75 must be allowed to present
additional evidence of intellectual disability, including additional evidence of subaverage
intellectual functioning and evidence of the second and third prongs of the analysis-deficits
in adaptive functioning and onset before the age of eighteen." Pizzuto v. Blades, 2016 WL
6963030, *5 (D. Idaho 2016). However, recognizing the limitations of AEDPA, the court
explained that, because the holding from Hall was not clearly established at the time of the
Idaho Supreme Court's decision in 2008, the Idaho Supreme Court was only bound by the
holding from Atkins, and, therefore, the court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an
unreasonable application of, Atkins. Id. at *8-9.
Alternatively, the district court assumed that, even if the Idaho Supreme Court
established a hard IQ score of 70 and Atkins was clearly established, the supreme court's
decision that Pizzuto failed to establish that "any intellectual functioning developed before
he turned eighteen-the third prong of the intellectual disability analysis," "was not contrary
to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Supreme Court precedent." Id. at
9 (emphasis in original).
Finally, the district court reexamined Pizzuto's ID claim under de nova review, and
initially concluded that his request to reopen the evidentiary hearing was unwarranted
because he "had an adequate opportunity and strong incentive to bring forward all his
evidence at the evidentiary hearing." Id. at* 11 The court then explained that "nothing in
Hall renders suspect any of the Court's previous findings and conclusions on de nova
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review" and, declining to "re-invent the wheel," adopted its previous de nova analysis from
the first decision and the denial of Pizzuto' s Rule 59(e) motion. Id.
Applying the "deferential review" of AEDPA to the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision, which relied only on the record before the state court, the Ninth Circuit affirmed,
concluding the state court's decision was neither contrary to, nor an unreasonable
application of, Supreme Court precedent because the only precedent available to the state
court was Atkins; Hall and its progeny were decided after the Idaho Supreme Court filed
its decision and the new requirements from Hall - that the legal determination of
intellectual disability be informed by the medical communities diagnostic framework - was
not mandated by Atkins. Pizzuto v. Blades, 933 F.3d 1166, 1179-85 (9 th Cir. 2019). The
court also addressed each of Pizzuto's arguments under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2), and
concluded that Pizzuto failed to establish the Idaho Supreme Court's decision was based
upon an unreasonable determination of facts even though the post-conviction court did not
conduct an evidentiary hearing. Id. at 1185-90. Based upon Pizzuto's failure to overcome
the limitations associated with 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d), the court declined to address the
district court's de nova review of Pizzuto's ID claim based on the evidentiary hearing
evidence or "address whether Pizzuto is intellectually disabled or whether his execution
would violate the Eighth Amendment." Id. However, in dicta, the court stated its decision
"does not preclude the Idaho courts from reconsidering those questions in light of
intervening events," particularly subsequent Supreme Court precedent. Id.
Based upon the Ninth Circuit's dicta, Pizzuto has now filed his Motion under
I.R.C.P. 60(b )(6).
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ARGUMENT

A.

Introduction
Pizzuto contends his Motion is timely because it was filed within 42 days of the

Ninth Circuit's decision. (Brief, p.4.) However, the Ninth Circuit's decision is not the
triggering event for timeliness, and Pizzuto' s reliance upon that opinion is misplaced
because Hall is the first case that the Supreme Court instructed that, "[i]n determining who
qualifies as intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community's
opinions." Hall, 572 U.S. at 710. Therefore, Hall is the triggering event for determining
the timeliness of Pizzuto' s Motion.
Pizzuto next contends he has established unique and compelling circumstances
because, according to Pizzuto, the Ninth Circuit's decision undermines the Idaho Supreme
Court's decision, which did not comply with the latest scientific and legal standards.
(Brief, pp.5-9.) Alternatively, Pizzuto contends he has established unique and compelling
circumstances because his Atkins post-conviction attorney was ineffective "by needlessly
undercutting her own request for evidentiary development" when she failed to request a
hearing on her motion for additional psychological testing. (Brief, pp.9-12.)
Pizzuto' s arguments fail because no Idaho appellate court has ever concluded a
district court can reopen a case based upon a subsequent decision from another court that
contends an Idaho Supreme Court's decision did not comply with the latest scientific and
legal standards even though it complied with the scientific and legal standards that existed
at the time the opinion was issued, particularly when the Rule 60(b )(6) motion is made
more than eleven years after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision was issued. Moreover,
the Ninth Circuit's dicta does not address the fact that it affirmed the factual finding made
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by the Idaho Supreme Court that Pizzuto failed to establish prong three of LC. § 192515A(l)(a) - that the "onset of significant subaverage general intelligence functioning
and significant limitations in adaptive functioning must occur before age eighteen (18)
years." Further, any alleged negligence by Pizzuto's post-conviction attorney hardly
constitutes a complete absence of post-conviction representation, the standard required to
find "unique and compelling circumstances" warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
Finally, based the reports of Drs. Weinstein, Patton and Merikangas - all of which
were completed after the Idaho Supreme Court's decision on March 19, 2008 - Pizzuto
contends he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing because there is a genuine issue of material
fact, and such a hearing is mandated by the Constitution. (Brief, pp.12-20.) Pizzuto's
argument fails because the merits of his Motion fail in that he is not entitled to relief under
Rule 60(b )(6). Moreover, because of the federal evidentiary hearing, a state evidentiary
hearing is barred under the doctrine of res judicata, particularly since the state established,
based upon the testing completed by Dr. Beaver, which the federal district court credited,
that Pizzuto's IQ is well above the 70 threshold for ID.

B.

General Legal Standards Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6)
"Petitions for post-conviction relief are civil proceedings governed by the Idaho

Rules of Civil Procedure." Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 724 (quotes, citation, and brackets
omitted). Under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6), the court may "relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding" for "any other reason that justifies relief."
"Although the court is vested with broad discretion in determining a Rule 60(b) motion, its
discretion is limited and may be granted only on a showing of unique and compelling
circumstances justifying relief." In re SRBA Case No. 39576, 164 Idaho 241, 252, 429
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P.3d 129 (2018) (quotes, citation, and brackets omitted); see also Eby v. State, 148 Idaho
731,736,228 P.3d 998 (2010) (same); Ross v. State, 141 Idaho 670, 672, 115 P.3d 761
(Ct. App. 2005) ("The party making a Rule 60(b)(6) motion must demonstrate unique and
compelling circumstances justifying relief.").
Idaho's appellate courts have yet to define exactly what constitutes "unique and
compelling circumstances justifying relief." However, "relief under Rule 60(b )(6) may be
appropriate where the district court granted relief that is inconsistent with the pleadings
and evidence in the case or is beyond what was sought in the complaint." Profits Plus
Capital Management, LLC v. Podesta, 156 Idaho 873, 886, 332 P.3d 785 (2014) (citing
Dawson v. Cheyovich Family Trust, 149 Idaho 375, 380-81, 234 P.3d 699 (2010)).
Additionally, "the complete absence of meaningful representation in a post-conviction
proceeding may be 'unique and compelling circumstances' warranting relief under LR. C.P.
60(b)( 6)." Id. (citing Eby. 148 Idaho at 73 7). The supreme court has also affirmed granting
relief "where defense counsel's representation to an unrepresented plaintiff constituted
overreaching." Id. (citing Hopkins v. Troutner, 134 Idaho 445, 447-48, 4 P.3d 557 (2000)).
However, Idaho's appellate courts have "infrequently granted relief under Rule 60(b)(6)."
Berg v. Kendall, 147 Idaho 571, 578, 212 P.3d 1001 (2009).
Even if"unique and compelling circumstances" are demonstrated, "A motion under
Rule 60(b) must be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1 ), (2), and (3) no more
than 6 months after the entry of the judgment or order or the date of the proceeding."
I.R.C.P. 60(c)(l). "What constitutes a reasonable time depends upon the facts in each
individual case." Viafax Corp. v. Stuckenbrock, 134 Idaho 65, 70, 995 P.2d 835 (Ct. App.
2000). However, "[t]he six-month period specified in Rule 60(b) is the outermost limit,
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and a motion may be rejected as untimely if not made within a 'reasonable time' even
though the six-month period has not elapsed." Id. at 71. For example, in Viafax, the Idaho
Court of Appeals concluded that a "delay of nearly five months in seeking Rule 60(b)
relief' was not a reasonable time.

134 Idaho at 71.

Ultimately, "[t]he question of

reasonableness is ordinarily a question of fact to be resolved by the trier of fact." Davis v.
Parrish, 131 Idaho 595, 597, 961 P.3d 1198 (1998).
In the context of deciding the timeliness of successive post-conviction claims, a
"reasonable time" is measured from the date the petitioner discovered the factual basis of
the claim being asserted. See Charboneau v. State, 144 Idaho 900, 905, 174 P.3d 870
(2007). And in the context of successive capital post-conviction cases, the reasonable time
period "is forty-two days after the petitioner knew or reasonably should have known of the
claim, unless the petitioner shows that there were extraordinary circumstances that
prevented him or her from filing the claim within that period. In that event, it still must be
filed within a reasonable time after the claim was known or knowable." Pizzuto IV, 146
Idaho at 727. "The reasonable time at issue is the time necessary to develop sufficient facts
to file the post-conviction proceeding, not the time necessary to develop all facts that will
be offered in an attempt to prove the claim." Id.

C.

Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish His Motion Is Timely
Pizzuto's timeliness argument is premised upon his belief that the Ninth Circuit's

August 14, 2019 opinion was the triggering device for filing his Motion. (Brief, p.4.)
However, the underlying legal and factual basis for Pizzuto's Motion is the Idaho Supreme
Court's alleged failure to comply with the latest scientific and legal standards as articulated
in Hall, 572 U.S. at 710, which instructed that, "[i]n determining who qualifies as
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intellectually disabled, it is proper to consult the medical community's opinions." Hall was
issued May 27, 2014, but Pizzuto did not file his Motion until September 25, 2019, more
than five years later.
Obviously, Pizzuto was aware of Hall, because on July 15, 2014, the Ninth Circuit
withdrew its prior opinion, vacated the federal district court's decision, and remanded "for
further proceedings consistent with Hall." Pizzuto, 758 F.3d at 1179. Rather than file a
motion in state court, Pizzuto elected to throw all of his eggs into the federal habeas basket
and have the federal court decide the constitutionality of his death sentence under Hall,
without any input from Idaho's courts. Simply stated, all of the legal and factual bases for
Pizzuto's Motion were known on May 27, 2014, when Hall was issued. Pizzuto did not
need the Ninth Circuit to tell him that the Idaho Supreme Court's decision did not comply
with Hall and the latest scientific and legal standards articulated therein. He should have
filed any request for relief based upon Hall and its progeny in state court with 42 days of
Hall being issued.
Even after remand when the federal district court denied relief on November 28,
2016, and concluded that Hall and its progeny did not entitle him to relief under AEDP A
or de nova review, Pizzuto, 2016 WL 6963030, *6-11, Pizzuto filed nothing in state court,
but chose to make all his Hall arguments before the Ninth Circuit. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit
noted that both parties not only discussed Atkins and Hall, but also the Supreme Court's
more recent decisions in Brumfield v. Cain, --- U.S.---, 135 S.Ct. 2269 (2015) and Moore
v. Texas, --- U.S. ---, 137 S.Ct. 1039 (2017). Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1179. Obviously,
nothing prevented Pizzuto from filing his Motion years ago; he simply chose tactically to
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wait for the Ninth Circuit's decision and then attempt to reopen his current post-conviction
case, thereby further delaying his execution.
As demonstrated by the numerous successive post-conviction petitions detailed
above, which were rejected because the claims were known or reasonably could have been
known when Pizzuto filed his first post-conviction petition years ago, coupled with his
requests to file successive habeas petitions or other collateral challenges in federal court,
Pizzuto has embarked upon a strategy of delay. His decision to wait until the Ninth Circuit
issued its recent decision to file his Motion further demonstrates his intent is to delay by
filing his Motion and litigating his Atkins claim via an evidentiary hearing even though he
had an evidentiary hearing in federal court that addressed the issues he raises in his Motion.
When all the facts are considered in Pizzuto' s case, particularly his penchant for
filing successive post-conviction petitions and raising claims that should have been
addressed when he filed his first post-conviction petition, waiting for years after Hall was
issued is not "reasonable" under I.R.C.P 60(b)(6), the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure
Act, or I.C. § 19-2719. In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 213, 766 P.2d 678 (1988), the
Idaho Supreme Court discussed the purpose and policy behind the passage of I.C. § 192719:
The underlying legislative purpose behind the statute stated the need to
expeditiously conclude criminal proceedings and recognized the use of
dilatory tactics by those sentenced to death to "thwart their sentences." The
statute's purpose is to "avoid such abuses of legal process by requiring that
all collateral claims for relief ... be consolidated in one proceeding.... "
We hold that the legislature's determination that it was necessary to reduce
the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition
of the 42-daytime limit set for LC.§ 19-2719. The legislature has identified
the problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is
rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of expediting
constitutionally imposed sentences.
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That same purpose applies equally to Pizzuto' s Motion. Based upon his past history
before the Idaho and federal courts, Pizzuto' s Motion utilizes "dilatory tactics" that are
designed to "thwart his sentence." This Court should not tolerate Pizzuto's antics. Because
his Motion is not timely, on that basis alone it should be denied.

D.

Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish Unique And Compelling Circumstances
a.

The Ninth Circuit's Decision Does Not Create Unique and Compelling
Circumstances

Pizzuto contends the Ninth Circuit's dicta establishes unique and compelling
circumstances justifying relief. (Brief, pp.5-9.) While Idaho's appellate courts have not
defined exactly what constitutes "unique and compelling circumstances," Pizzuto has
failed to cite any case, from Idaho or any other jurisdiction, that supports his argument, and
the state is aware of no such precedent. Rather, relief under I.C.R.P. 60(b )(6) has been
limited to cases where the district court granted relief that is inconsistent with the pleading
and evidence or is beyond what was sought in the complaint, the complete absence of
meaningful representation in post-conviction proceedings, and where defense counsel's
representation to an unrepresented plaintiff constituted overreaching. Profile Plus Capital
Management, LLC, 156 Idaho at 886.
The state recognizes the Ninth Circuit concluded the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision "was inconsistent with the clinical definitions in place at the time of [its] decision"
because the supreme court allegedly applied a "hard IQ-70 cutoff."

Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at

1182. However, as also recognized by the Ninth Circuit, "At the time of the state court's
decision in 2008, it was not yet apparent that states were required to define ID in
accordance with these prevailing clinical definitions." Id. Moreover, the Ninth Circuit
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acknowledged, "This is not a case in which the state court utterly disregarded the clinical
definitions" because LC. § 19-2515A(l) "tracks the clinical definitions cited by Atkins"
and the Idaho Supreme Court "recognized the existence of a standard error of measurement
of plus or minus five points and afforded Pizzuto an opportunity to 'present additional
evidence of intellectual disability even when an IQ test score is above 70. "' Id. at 1183
(quoting Hall, 572 U.S. at 717). Therefore, at the time of the Idaho Supreme Court's
decision, there was no constitutional violation based upon Atkins, and neither Hall nor the
Ninth Circuit's dicta mandate that the issue be revisited at this juncture.
In short, Pizzuto is demanding another bite at the apple based upon law that did not
exist at the time of the Idaho Supreme Court's decision. This does not constitute "unique
and compelling circumstances." It is not uncommon for the law to change. And even in
death penalty cases, the courts are not required to apply the new law to cases where the
courts appropriately relied upon the former law. For example, prior to the Supreme Court's
decision in Ring. 536 U.S. 584, LC. § 19-2515 required the district court to determine the
existence of any statutory aggravating factors that made a murderer eligible for the death
penalty, and then determine whether the mitigating circumstances are sufficiently
compelling to make imposition of the death penalty unjust. 2000 Idaho Sess. Laws, Ch.
287, § 1 (codified at LC. § 19-2515(f) (2000)). However, on June 24, 2002, the Supreme
Court issued Ring. concluding the Sixth Amendment requires juries to find statutory
aggravating factors because they "operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a
greater offense." 536 U.S. at 609 (quotes and citation omitted). In Schriro v. Summerlin,
542 U.S. 348, 358 (2004), the Supreme Court reasoned that Ring does not apply
retroactively to cases already final on direct review.

The Idaho Supreme Court also
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concluded, under state law, that Ring did not apply retroactively to five death-sentenced
murderers, including Paul Rhoades and Richard Leavitt. Rhoades et al., 149 Idaho at 133.
Nevertheless, despite the fact that Rhoades and Leavitt's death sentences were
unconstitutional as a result of Ring, which was the law as of June 24, 2002, they were
executed after Ring was decided even though the statutory aggravating factors were found
by a judge. See Creech v. Reinke, 2012 WL 1995085, *2 (D. Idaho 2012) (noting that
"Leavitt' s scheduled execution would be the second to occur in Idaho within a year").
In Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 343 (2009), the Supreme Court adopted a new
rule involving automobile searches, overruling New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454 (1981 ).
Nevertheless, in Davis v. U.S., 564 U.S. 229, 239 (2011), the Supreme Court concluded
that if a police officer was in compliance with binding precedent at the time, i.e., Belton,
the exclusionary rule would not be applied even though the evidence was obtained illegally
under Gant. In Whorton v. Bockting. 549 U.S. 406, 416-21 (2007), the Supreme Court
concluded that Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), which announced a new
Confrontation Clause rule, would not be applied retroactively.
There is nothing "unique and compelling" about new areas of law that require
review under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6). As explained above, the law is constantly evolving and
changing, but courts in collateral proceedings, such as in this case, are generally permitted
to rely upon the law as it existed prior to direct review. See Griffith v. Kentucky. 479 U.S.
314 (1987) (new rules are generally applicable only to cases that are still on direct review);
State v. Hooper, 145 Idaho 139, 141 n.1, 176 P.3d 911 (2007) (quotes and citation omitted)
("When the U.S. Supreme Court applies a rule of federal law to the parties before it, that
rule is the controlling interpretation of federal law and must be given full retroactive effect
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in all cases still open on direct review."). In short, merely because the law changed as a
result of Hall and its progeny does not mean there are unique and compelling circumstances
that warrant review under Rule 60(b)( 6).
Even in the context of an Atkins claim, the Supreme Court does not appear to be
concerned that a murderer's death sentence will be carried out even though the state court
relied only upon Atkins because Hall and its progeny had not been issued at the time of the
state court's decision. In Shoop v. Hill, --- U.S.---, 139 S.Ct. 504,505 (2019) (per curium),
the Supreme Court reversed the Sixth Circuit's conclusion that the Ohio courts' decision
was contrary to Atkins. The Supreme Court noted that the Ohio Supreme Court denied
review in 2009, but the Sixth Circuit relied upon Moore, 137 S.Ct. 1039, which was not
issued until 2017, to grant relief under Atkins. Shoop, 139 S.Ct. at 506. Consequently, the
Supreme Court reversed, and ordered the Sixth Circuit to determine whether its conclusions
could be "sustained strictly on legal rules that were clearly established in the decisions of
this Court at the relevant time," which would be at the time of the Ohio Supreme Court's
decision in 2009. Id. at 509.
Moreover, Pizzuto fails to recognize the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Idaho Supreme
Court's finding that the post-conviction court could have inferred that Pizzuto's IQ
declined between his eighteen birthday and when the first IQ test was given by Dr. Emery
after Pizzuto murdered the Hemdons. Idaho Code § 19-2515A(l)(a) requires that the
"onset of significant subaverage general intelligence functioning and significant limitations
in adaptive functioning must occur before age eighteen (18) years." The Idaho Supreme
Court expressly explained that the evidence Pizzuto submitted allowed the post-conviction
court to infer that Pizzuto's IQ decreased between his eighteenth birthday and the date Dr.
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Emery gave Pizzuto the first IQ test. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 729. As recognized by the
supreme court, the evidence provided by Pizzuto established that he had a "long history of
drug abuse and his epilepsy would have negatively impacted his mental functioning." Id.
Pizzuto challenged the Idaho Supreme Court's finding, but the Ninth Circuit
concluded that, in light of the evidence Pizzuto presented from Drs. Merikangas and
Beaver, "it was not unreasonable for the Idaho Supreme Court to determine that the state
trial court reasonably could have inferred that Pizzuto' s IQ may have declined as a result
of drug abuse or epilepsy" even if a "more reasonable inference would be that he was
substantially drug free and not experiencing seizures after he turned 19." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d
at 1188. Therefore, because Pizzuto was mandated to establish all three prongs of LC. §
19-2515A(l)(a), and because the Ninth Circuit affirmed the Idaho Supreme Court's finding
that Pizzuto' s IQ could have decreased significantly between his eighteenth birthday and
when Dr. Emery gave him the first IQ test, the Ninth Circuit's decision does not undermine
the Idaho Supreme Court's decision, but actually supports that aspect of the decision.

b.

Pizzuto Has Failed To Establish That Representation By His Prior Atkins
Counsel Involved The Complete Absence of Meaningful Representation

Pizzuto next contends that "serious missteps made by his prior attorney in these
post-conviction proceedings" provide unique and compelling circumstances warranting
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). (Brief, pp.9-12.) Pizzuto's argument is based upon Eby, 18
Idaho at 734-38. However, the facts in Eby, and the law that was established therein run
far afield from Pizzuto's case.
After his convictions were affirmed on appeal, Eby filed a pro se post-conviction
petition on January 24, 2002. Id. at 732-33. The district court soon appointed the public
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defender to represent Eby, who withdrew but designated a conflict attorney to represent
Eby. Id. at 733. No action was taken by the new attorney, and on August 12, 2002, the
district court issued a proposed dismissal for inactivity under I.R.C.P. 40(c), but withdrew
the notice based upon representations by the public defender regarding the appointment of
another attorney. Id. On October 8, 2002, the prosecutor filed a motion for summary
dismissal. Id. A second conflict attorney, Rolf Kehne, filed a notice of appearance on
October 25, 2002. Id. Between that date and June 14, 2005, the district court issued five
notices of intent to dismiss for inactivity, but Kehne filed no amendments to the petition or
responses to the state's motion, even though he stated on February 25, 2005, that an
amended petition would be filed no later than March 4, 2005. Id. The case was finally
dismissed for inactivity on June 14, 2005. Id.
On August 9, 2005, Eby inquired of the clerk regarding the status of his case, and
began filing pro se motions, including a motion to appoint counsel. Id. The district court
ordered that a new attorney be appointed, and on March 7, 2006, the public defender filed
a notice designating Linda Payne as Eby's fourth post-conviction attorney. Id. As of May
24, 2006, Payne was apparently unaware that Eby's case had already been dismissed, but
on August 22, 2006, she filed an amended petition raising a new sentencing claim, which
prompted an objection from the state because Eby's petition had already been dismissed.
Id. at 733-34. On April 9, 2007, Payne filed a motion to set aside the order of dismissal,
which was heard April 17, 2007, when Payne argued for the first time that relief should be
available to Eby under LR. C.P. 60(b). Id. The district court denied the motion. Id.
After concluding that relief from a dismissal for inactivity could be addressed in a
Rule 60(b) motion, id. at 734-36, the Idaho Supreme Court addressed the questions of
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whether "neglect by post-conviction relief counsel [constitutes] grounds upon which relief
under I.R.C.P. 60(b)(6) may be granted" and whether the district court's denial of Eby's
motion constituted an abuse of discretion, id. at 736. After noting the limited nature of its
decision, explaining that "individuals are generally bound by their attorney's actions," and
reaffirming there is no constitutional right to counsel in post-conviction proceedings, the
court concluded, "Given the unique status of a post-conviction proceeding, and given the
complete absence of meaningful representation in the only available proceeding for Eby

to advance constitutional challenges to his conviction and sentence, we conclude that this
case may present the 'unique and compelling circumstances' in which I.R. C.P. 60(b)( 6)
relief may well be warranted." Id. at 736-37 (emphasis added).
Pizzuto' s contention regarding "serious missteps made by his prior attorney"
(Brief, p.9), assuming but not conceding they are "serious missteps," do not constitute a
"complete absence of meaningful representation" during his post-conviction case.
Pizzuto' s argument is based upon prior counsel's actions that resulted in the postconviction court implicitly denying a motion for additional testing when the court
dismissed Pizzuto's Atkins petition. (Brief, pp.9-12.) After Pizzuto filed his Atkins
petition, the state filed a Motion for Dismissal and a motion for automatic disqualification
of the district judge, the Honorable John H. Bradbury, which was granted because Judge
Bradbury was not the judge who had heard the underlying criminal case. The Honorable
George R. Reinhardt, III, who was the judge that presided over Pizzuto' s prior proceedings,
was appointed.
Pursuant to I.R.C.P. 40, on August 4, 2003, Pizzuto's attorney, JoanM. Fisher, filed
a motion for automatic disqualification and, alternatively, disqualification for cause. Fisher
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raised several arguments in her supporting brief that, irrespective of I.R.C.P.
40(d)(l )(I)(ii) 6 which bars the automatic disqualification of the judge that entered the
judgment of conviction being challenged in post-conviction, Judge Reinhardt should be
automatically disqualified. She also filed a supporting affidavit and briefed the issue of
disqualifying Judge Reinhardt for cause. Although her motion for disqualification was still
pending, on October 25, 2004, Fisher also filed a motion to permit additional testing to
complete a neuropsychiatric evaluation. A supplemental brief supporting the motion for
disqualification was filed December 3, 2004. On January 18, 2005, Judge Reinhardt denied
Fisher's motion to disqualify.
Fisher responded by filing a motion for an interlocutory appeal, which Judge
Reinhardt denied on April 22, 2005. That same day, Judge Reinhardt entered a briefing
schedule.

Continuing to pursue the disqualification issue, Fisher filed a motion for

interlocutory appeal with the Idaho Supreme Court on April 29, 2005 (Brief, Exhibit 1),
and a second motion for interlocutory appeal on May 9, 2005 (Brief, Exhibit 2), which
were both of denied by the Idaho Supreme Court on June 22, 2005 (Brief, Exhibit 3).
Pursuant to the scheduling order, the parties filed briefs regarding the Atkins claim.
Fisher also filed a significant number of supporting affidavits and, on September 23, 2005,
a Motion for Summary Judgment asserting there were "no genuine issues of material fact
in this case." At that time, Judge Reinhardt had not ruled on Fisher's motion for additional
testing, presumably because she had not noticed it for hearing. After additional briefing
was completed regarding Fisher's Motion for Summary Judgment, Judge Reinhardt denied
her Motion for Summary Judgment and granted the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal.

6

Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 40(d)(l)(I)(ii) has been renumbered to Rule 40(a)(8)(B).
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On appeal, Fisher continued to press the issue of disqualification, explaining why
I.R.C.P 40(d)(l )(I)(ii), which prevented the automatic disqualification of the judge that
entered the judgment of conviction being challenged in post-conviction, should not apply
under the facts of Pizzuto's case. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 724-25. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court rejected the arguments, as well as the arguments addressing why Judge
Reinhardt should have been disqualified for cause. Id.
The Ninth Circuit noted Fisher's failure to seek a hearing on her motion for
additional testing, and speculated that Fisher "apparently concluded that, because the court
had erroneously denied the motion to disqualify, any order entered by the court on the
question of testing would be void." Pizzuto, 933 F.3d at 1173 n.2.
Based upon Fisher's failure to seek a hearing or get a ruling on her motion for
additional testing, Pizzuto contends, "By staking a key request for evidentiary development
entirely on the success of a far-fetched legal gambit, prior counsel did not discharge [her]
duties, and her performance does not survive [ ] judicial scrutiny," which, according to
Pizzuto, constitutes unique and compelling circumstances under Eby.

(Brief, p.12.)

Pizzuto' s argument fails on several fronts.
First, Pizzuto has failed to establish that Fisher's failure to notice her motion for
additional testing for hearing constitutes a "complete absence of meaningful
representation." Eby, 148 Idaho at 737. As the Idaho Supreme Court explained, the facts
in Eby involved "years of shocking and disgraceful neglect of his case by a series of
attorneys." Id. at 732. Fisher's failure to notice the motion for additional testing for
hearing was a single incident that arguably was based upon strategic reasons, and became
moot when she filed the Motion for Summary Judgment. Indeed, Pizzuto does not even

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 26
Page 753

allege a "complete absence of meaningful representation," presumably because he
recognizes the record does not support such an allegation.
Rather, Pizzuto's case is akin to Devan v. State, 162 Idaho 520, 523-24, 399 P.3d
84 7 (Ct. App. 2017), where the court of appeals recognized that Eby should not be read "to
open the door to challenge the effectiveness of post-conviction counsel by virtue of a Rule
60(b) motion." The court of appeals noted that, while post-conviction counsel failed to file
a response to the state's motion to dismiss, counsel met with the petitioner, reviewed the
case to determine whether to file an amended petition, and appeared at the summary
dismissal hearing. Id. at 823. In Dixon v. State, 157 Idaho 582, 587-88, 338 P.3d 461 (Ct.
App. 2014 ), the court distinguished Eby because counsel presented his claim and
represented him at an evidentiary hearing. "While there may have been a fatal evidentiary
gap at the post-conviction trial, Rule 60(b)(6) does not provide an avenue to retry the case
or supplement the evidence" "even if we consider that Dixon's post-conviction counsel
failed to present evidence at the post-conviction hearing as to one of the claims." Id. In
Bias v. State, 159 Idaho 696, 706, 365 P.3d 1050 (Ct. App. 2015), the court of appeals
rejected the notion that ineffective assistance of post-conviction counsel constitutes a
complete absence of meaningful representation, noting that post-conviction counsel filed a
responsive brief and supporting affidavits after the state filed its motion for summary
dismissal. Id. at 707.
Obviously, Fisher did far more than counsel in Devan, Dixon, and Bias. She filed
the initial petition, various motions, and numerous affidavits, and appeared and argued at
several hearings. She even sought an interlocutory appeal before the Idaho Supreme Court,
and continued to press Pizzuto' s claims and arguments before the Idaho Supreme Court in
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the appeal from the denial of her motions and post-conviction relief. Her performance
hardly constitutes a complete absence of meaningful representation.
Second, Eby involved counsel's performance in the first post-conviction case, not
a successive post-conviction case as in this case. As explained in Parvin v. State, 157 Idaho
518, 521, 337 P.3d 677 (Ct. App. 2014), "The rule 60(b) motion that Parvin wishes to be
considered must be filed in his first post-conviction case." See also Lopez v. State, 157
Idaho 795, 798, 339 P.3d 1199 (Ct. App. 2014) (quoting Eby. 148 Idaho at 736) ("The
Court's decision in Eby was 'limited in scope' to requests for relief from final judgments
in an initial post-conviction proceeding under Rule 60(b )(6).").
Third, as demonstrated by her briefing before the post-conviction court and the
Idaho Supreme Court, Fisher's arguments regarding disqualification were hardly "farfetched." Certainly, the Idaho Supreme Court did not consider the arguments to be "farfetched" or even without merit, either with respect to the automatic or cause motions for
disqualification. Pizzuto IV, 146 Idaho at 724-26. And merely because it was "foreseeable
that the Idaho Supreme Court might reject them in favor of the plain language of the rule"
(Motion, p.11) (emphasis added), does not equate into something that is "far-fetched."
Capital attorneys are certainly known to file motions that dig deep into the well of their
imaginations, but this is hardly one of those situations. Indeed, the ABA Guidelines for
the Appointment and Performance of Defense Counsel in Death Penalty Cases mandate
that post-conviction counsel "continue an aggressive investigation of all aspects" of a death
penalty case and seek to litigate "all arguably meritorious" issues. Guideline 10.15.l(C)
(2003); Guideline 10.15.l(E)(4).
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Finally, once Fisher filed her Motion for Summary Judgment asserting there were
"no genuine issues of material fact in this case," the motion for additional testing became
moot.

Simply stated, Fisher asserted that additional testing was no longer mandated

because she had already provided sufficient facts that warranted summary judgment.
While her Motion for Summary Judgment ultimately failed, that does not mean there was
a complete absence of meaningful representation.
Pizzuto has failed to establish that Fisher's work prior to the post-conviction court
dismissing his case falls under the gambit of I.C.R.P. 60(b)(6) because her work was
extensive and hardly constituted a complete absence of meaningful representation.

E.

Pizzuto Is Neither Entitled Nor Constitutionally Mandated To Another Evidentiary
Hearing
As a "consequence" of reopening his case, Pizzuto contends he is entitled to "the

restarting of this post-conviction action," including amending his Atkins petition and being
entitled and constitutionally required to have an evidentiary hearing. (Brief, pp.12-20.)
Because Pizzuto has failed to demonstrate his Motion is timely and demonstrated unique
and compelling circumstances as required under Rule 60(b)(6), he is not entitled to any
relief, let alone the "restarting of his post-conviction action," which could include
amending his petition and an evidentiary hearing.
Additionally, even if Pizzuto met his timeliness and Rule 60(b)(6) burdens, based
upon the litigation in federal district court, particularly the evidentiary hearing where the
parties presented all of their ID evidence, under the doctrine of res judicata he is barred
from further litigating his ID claim. In Ticor Title Co. v. Stanion, 144 Idaho 119, 123, 157
P .3d 613 (2007), the supreme court discussed the purposes behind res judicata:
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(1) [I]t preserves the acceptability of judicial dispute resolution against the
corrosive disrespect that would follow if the same matter were twice
litigated to inconsistent results; (2) it serves the public interest in protecting
the courts against the burdens of repetitious litigation; and (3) it advances
the private interest in repose from the harassment of repetitive claims.
While "[t]he doctrine of res judicata covers both claim preclusion (true res
judicata) and issue preclusion (collateral estoppel)," "[s]eparate tests are used to determine

whether claim preclusion or issue preclusion applies." Id. Five factors are required for
issue preclusion, which include:
(1) [T]he party against whom the earlier decision was asserted had a full
and fair opportunity to litigate the issue decided in the earlier case; (2) the
issue decided in the prior litigation was identical to the issue presented in
the present action; (3) the issue sought to be precluded was actually decided
in the prior litigation; (4) there was a final judgment on the merits in the
prior litigation; and (5) the party against whom the issue is asserted was a
party or in privity with a party to the prior litigation.
Id. at 124.
There are three requirements for claim preclusion, "(1) same parties; (2) same
claim; and (3) final judgment." Id. "[T]he 'sameness' of a claim for res judicata purposes
is determined by examining the operative facts underlying the two causes of action. State
v. Wolfe, 158 Idaho 55, 63, 343 P.3d 497 (2015). "Claim preclusion bars adjudication not
only on the matters offered and received to defeat the claim, but also as to 'every matter
which might and should have been litigated in the first suit."' Ticor, 144 Idaho at 126
(quoting Magic Valley Radiology, P.A. v. Kolouch, 123 Idaho 434, 437, 849 P.2d 107
(1993)).
In State v. Rhoades, 134 Idaho 862, 482, 11 P.3d 481 (2000), the supreme court
applied res judicata to a Rule 35 motion that was raised before the district court, but never
appealed, and then raised in a second Rule 35 motion that was appealed. The supreme

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S MOTION TO ALTER OR AMEND JUDGMENT - 30
Page 757

court reasoned, "the doctrine of res judicata can be applied to bar consideration of
subsequent Rule 35 motions to the extent those motions attempt to relitigate issues already
finally decided in earlier Rule 35 motions."

Id.

The court also rejected Rhoades'

contention that the second Rule 35 motion "is not the same issue litigated earlier,"
concluding, "[w ]hile the two motions may be worded somewhat differently, they
nevertheless encompass the same issue: namely, whether the district judge erred in giving
Rhoades a separate sentence enhancement for each crime for which he was convicted,
rather than a single sentence enhancement for his entire course of conduct." Id. at 843.
The doctrine of resjudicata has been applied in both criminal, State v. Creech, 132
Idaho 1, 9 n.1, 966 P.2d 1 (1998), and post-conviction cases, Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho
791, 797, 291 P.3d 474 (Ct. App. 2012) (citing cases). In Creech, 132 Idaho at 9 n.1
(citations omitted), the Idaho Supreme Court applied the doctrine of res judicata in a capital
case, and concluded it also applies to any issues adjudicated in federal court even if the
case is remanded to state court, explaining:
This doctrine applies to any issues raised by Creech and adjudicated in his
habeas corpus proceeding in the federal courts. Habeas corpus proceedings,
like state post-conviction relief proceedings, are separate and distinct
proceedings, separate from criminal proceedings, and are civil in nature.
Thus, when legal issues are decided in a criminal action on direct appeal,
the defendant is barred by the doctrine of res judicata from raising them
again in a post-conviction relief proceeding. Similarly, when an issue is
decided in a federal habeas corpus proceeding, the doctrine of res judicata
applies to prevent the issue from being addressed again by this Court on
remand.
Whether viewed under issue or claim preclusion, because of the litigation in federal
court regarding the same ID claim, Pizzuto is barred from having his current case reopened
under the doctrine of res judicata. As to issue preclusion, (1) the parties had a full and fair
opportunity to litigate the ID claim, including the issues associated with Hall, which
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requires that the legal determination of ID be informed by the medical communities
diagnostic framework (see Affidavit, Exhibits G-J); (2) the issue - whether Pizzuto is ID is identical to what was litigated in federal court; (3) whether Pizzuto is ID was decided by
the federal district court under de nova review based upon the evidence from the
evidentiaryhearing; (4) there was a final judgment; and (5) Pizzuto was clearly a party. As
to claim preclusion, (1) the parties were the same; (2) it is the same claim - whether Pizzuto
is ID; and (3) there was a final judgment.
Admittedly, on remand Pizzuto sought to reopen the federal evidentiary hearing to
present further evidence ofID. Pizzuto, 2016 WL 6963030 at *11. However, the federal
court rejected Pizzuto' s request, explaining:
Pizzuto has not convinced the Court that the previous evidentiary hearing
was insufficient in any way. [Pizzuto] had an adequate opportunity and a
strong incentive to bring forward all his evidence at the evidentiary hearing.
Not only has Pizzuto failed to prove that his IQ was 70 or below, but having
reviewed all the evidence once again on remand, the Court finds that Pizzuto
has also failed to prove that his IQ was 75 or below before he turned
eighteen. Thus, nothing in Hall renders suspect any of the Court's previous
findings and conclusions on de nova review.
Id.
Likewise Pizzuto has failed to establish any basis for presenting the same evidence
before this court when he had every opportunity to present all his evidence at the
evidentiary hearing in federal court. Pizzuto's attempt to have a "redo" in state court when
he failed to meet his burden in federal court is the very reason the doctrine of res judicata
was adopted. See Ticor Title Co., 144 Idaho at 123 (discussing the policies regarding the
res judicata doctrine). This Court should not be burdened with litigating a claim that was
rejected in federal court. Neither should the state, particularly Idaho County, be harassed
and required to litigate a claim already rejected in the federal court after a full evidentiary
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hearing. And the judicial system should not be saddled with the potential for inconsistent
results when the matter was fully litigated in federal court.
Additionally, Pizzuto' s reliance upon Brumfield supra, is misplaced. In Brumfield,
the issue before the court was AEDPA under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(2). The federal district
found Brumfield met his burden under § 2254(d)(2), conducted a federal evidentiary
hearing, and, based upon that evidence, concluded Brumfield met his burden of
establishing ID. Brumfield v. Cain, 744 F.3d 918, 922 (5 th Cir. 2014). On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit concluded the district court did not give proper AEDPA deference and, therefore,
should not have conducted the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 926. Consequently, the Fifth
Circuit disregarded the evidence presented during the evidentiary hearing.

Id.

The

Supreme Court reversed, but based only upon the Fifth Circuit's conclusion regarding
AEDPA deference. Brumfield, 135 S.Ct. at 2276-82. While the Fifth Circuit's judgment
was vacated, the case was "remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion,"
presumably to allow the Fifth Circuit to consider de nova the evidence that was presented
to the federal district judge at the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 2283.
This does not support Pizzuto' s contention that he is constitutionally mandated to
an evidentiary hearing in state court when he previously had one in federal court that
resulted in an adverse decision because he did not meet his burden of establishing ID. The
Supreme Court's entire analysis in Brumfield was based upon AEDPA, and did not
mandate that state courts are constitutionally required to provide every murderer sentenced
to death an evidentiary hearing just because of an ID claim.
Pizzuto anticipated the decision in Hall when he presented his evidence at the
federal evidentiary hearing. Indeed, he repeatedly argued that Atkins required the legal
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determination of intellectual disability be informed by the medical community's diagnostic
framework. In short, Pizzuto has now had two bites at the apple in federal court that have
been rejected, the litigation prior to Hall, and the litigation after his ID case was remanded
following Hall; he should not receive a third bite before this Court.

CONCLUSION
The state respectfully requests that Pizzuto' s Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment
be denied.
DATED this 7th day of October, 2019.

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
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below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following:
Jonah J. Horwitz
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho - Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Email: Jonah Horwitz@fd.org

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Court Filing

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
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Electronically Filed
1/10/2020 8:51 AM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Sherie Clark, Deputy Clerk

Jonah J. Horwitz, ID Bar No. 10494
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-5530
Facsimile: (208) 331-5559
Email: Jonah_Horwitz@fd.org
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
__________ )
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748
NOTICE OF HEARING

(CAPITAL CASE)

Undersigned counsel for Petitioner Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. hereby provides notice that
there will be a telephonic hearing on his Motion that Costs of Appeal be at County Expense, filed
January 10, 2020, on January 28, 2020, at 10 a.m., Pacific Time. The Court will initiate the call.
DATED this 10th day of January 2020.
/s/ Jonah J. Horwitz
Jonah J. Horwitz
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 10th day of January 2020, I served the foregoing document on
all interested parties, who are set forth below, via iCourt file and serve:
L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Statehouse Mail, Room 10
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

/s/ L. Hollis Ruggieri
L. Hollis Ruggieri
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Electronically Filed
1/15/2020 1 :00 PM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Sherie Clark, Deputy Clerk

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN
Attorney General
State of Idaho
COLLEEND. ZAHN
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Criminal Law Division
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
Telephone: (208) 334-4539
Fax: (208) 854-8074
lamont.anderson@ag.idaho.gov
Attorneys for Respondent

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
vs.
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748

RESPONSE TO PETITIONER'S
MOTION THAT COSTS OF
APPEAL BE AT COUNTY
EXPENSE

COMES NOW, Respondent, State ofldaho ("state"), by and through its attorney,
L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital Litigation Unit and Special
Prosecuting Attorney for Idaho County, and hereby responds to Petitioner's ("Pizzuto")
Motion that Costs of Appeal be at County Expense.
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On January 6, 2020, this Court filed a Memorandum Opinion and Order denying
Pizzuto's Motion to Alter or Amend Judgment. On January 1, 2020, Pizzuto filed a timely
Amended Notice of Appeal, challenging the Court's Memorandum Opinion and Order. On
that same date, Pizzuto filed a Motion that Costs of Appeal be at County Expense
("Motion") and supporting brief requesting "that the costs of appeal be at county expense,
including the costs associated with preparation of the clerk's record and the transcript."
While the state has no objection to preparation of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's
Transcript being prepared at county expense, the state objects to any other costs associated
with Pizzuto' s appeal being paid for by Idaho County. Specifically, the state opposes any
county money being paid to his attorneys for any aspect of Pizzuto' s appeal.
Pizzuto is currently represented by Jonah J. Horwitz in his capacity as an employee
of the Federal Defender Services of Idaho, Capital Habeas Unit. However, the Legislature,
as a matter of public policy, enacted the State Appellate Public Defender Act ("Act") in
1998 to reduce the costs to the counties associated with indigent criminal appeals. See LC.
§ 19-868. Under the Act, the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") "shall provide
representation for indigent defendants in felony criminal actions in the following cases,"
which includes "[ a]ppeals from the district court in post-conviction relief proceedings
brought pursuant to the uniform post-conviction procedure act, chapter 49, title 19, Idaho
Code, where the grant or denial of the post-conviction relief occurred on or after September
1, 1998." LC. § 19-870(2)(c). Of course, Pizzuto's successive post-conviction in this case
was filed in 2003. Therefore, Horwitz and his office should not be permitted to handle this
appeal. Rather, LC. § 19-870(2)(c) mandates that the SAPD be appointed and that, with
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the exception of the costs associated with the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts,
the State of Idaho incur the costs in pursuing this appeal through the SAPD' s office.
Admittedly, I.C. § 19-870(2) permits the services of the SAPD "only to those
counties participating in the capital crimes defense fund established pursuant to section 19863A, Idaho Code." However, undersigned counsel has been advised that Idaho County
is, in fact, a participant in the capital crimes defense fund. Therefore, while the state has
no objection to the relevant Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript being prepared at
county expense, the state requests that this Court appoint the SAPD to pursue Pizzuto' s
appeal, thereby complying with I.C. § 19-870 and limiting the costs to Idaho County that
are associated with the appeal.
However, while the state has no objection to the county incurring the costs
associated with the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript, the state does object to some
of the records and transcripts that have been requested by Pizzuto in his Notice of Appeal.
Specifically, the state objects to the transcription of any hearings held prior to the filing of
Pizzuto' s Motion to Alter or Amend on September 25, 2019. Pizzuto' s appeal is from this
Court's Memorandum Decision and Order denying Pizzuto's Motion to Alter or Amend.
Consequently, any hearings prior to the filing of his motion on September 25, 2019, that
were not previously transcribed, are irrelevant to any issue that could be raised before the
Idaho Supreme Court because this Court would not have relied on such transcripts. The
state further objects to Pizzuto's recommendation that the clerk take the Clerk's Record
and Reporter's Transcripts from the previous appeal beginning with the successive postconviction petition "and consolidate it with the newer filings on a single disc." (Amended
Notice of Appeal, p.3 n.2.) As this Court is undoubtedly aware, when there is a subsequent
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appeal in the same district court case after the issuance of a decision by Idaho's appellate
courts, the Idaho Supreme Court issues an order requiring the clerk to prepare only that
portion of the record that was not prepared in the prior appeal because the supreme court
and the parties already have the prior record. Obviously, this procedure saves the time and
expense associated with preparing a record that is already before the supreme court and
that the parties possess. Idaho County should not be burdened with the expense associated
with preparing those portions of the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcripts that are
already before the supreme court as a result of Pizzuto' s first appeal from the denial of his
successive post-conviction petition.
Therefore, while the state has no objection to Pizzuto's request that the costs of
preparing the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript after September 25, 2019, be at
county expense, the state objects to any other costs associated with this appeal being at
county expense, requests that the SAPD be appointed to pursue the appeal, and that the
Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript include only those portions of the record after
September 25, 2019.
DATED this 15 th day of January, 2020.

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 15 th day of January, 2020, I caused to
be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below,
postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following:
Jonah J. Horwitz
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho - Suite 900
Boise, ID 83702
Email: Jonah Horwitz@fd.org

~

U.S. Mail
Hand Delivery
Overnight Mail
Facsimile
Electronic Court Filing

Isl L. LaMont Anderson
L. LaMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
For Idaho County
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Electronically Filed
11/27/2019 12:47 PM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Nikki Sickels, Deputy Clerk

Jonah J. Horwitz, ID Bar No. 10494
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-5530
Facsimile: (208) 331-5559
Email: Jonah_Horwitz@fd.org
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
__________ )
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748
RESPONSE TO MOTION FOR
JUDICIAL NOTICE
(CAPITAL CASE)

Petitioner Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. has no objection to the State's motion for judicial
notice, filed October 7, 2019.
DATED this 27th day of November 2019.
/s/ Jonah J. Horwitz
Jonah J. Horwitz
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 27th day ofNovember 2019, I served the foregoing document
on all interested parties, who are set forth below, via iCourt file and serve:
L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Statehouse Mail, Room 10
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

/s/ L. Hollis Ruggieri
L. Hollis Ruggieri
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Electronically Filed
1/22/2020 9:51 AM
Second Judicial District, Idaho County
Kathy Ackerman, Clerk of the Court
By: Nikki Sickels, Deputy Clerk

Jonah J. Horwitz, ID Bar No. 10494
Federal Defender Services of Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
702 W. Idaho, Suite 900
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 331-5530
Facsimile: (208) 331-5559
Email: Jonah_Horwitz@fd.org
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

)
)
Petitioner,
)
)
)
V.
)
)
)
STATE OF IDAHO,
)
)
Respondent.
)
__________ )
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,

Case No. CV 03-34748
REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION
THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT
COUNTY EXPENSE

(CAPITAL CASE)

The State's response to Mr. Pizzuto's motion that costs of appeal be at county expense,
filed January 15, 2020 (hereinafter "Response" or "Resp.") acquiesces to the solitary request
made by the motion itself. To the extent the Response addresses other matters not raised by the
motion, it is procedurally improper and, in any event, meritless.
With respect to the former, the only action that undersigned counsel sought in his motion
that costs of appeal be at county expense, filed January 10, 2020 (hereinafter "Motion" or
"Mot.") was, naturally, for the costs of appeal to be at county expense. The State has no
objection to the Court waiving the appellate costs as a result of Mr. Pizzuto's indigence. See
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Resp. at 2. Rather, the only reservation the State has on that front is to the prospect of "county
money being paid to" undersigned counsel for his handling of the appeal. Id. To put the State's
mind at ease, undersigned counsel will not be seeking any such compensation. Counsel is a
salaried employee of the Capital Habeas Unit of Federal Defender Services of Idaho ("CHU"),
and does not need judicial reimbursement. Instead, the only appellate costs at issue are the
administrative fees associated with processing the appeal, such as transcription fees and the
expense of generating the clerk's record. Because the State has no opposition to the waiver of
those costs, and because Mr. Pizzuto is not asking for any others, there is no dispute before the
Court, and it can summarily grant the Motion. In light of that state of affairs, the Court may wish
to simply waive the appellate costs and vacate the scheduled hearing, which would expedite the
matter and avoid an unnecessary oral argument.
Every other subject addressed by the State in its Response is irrelevant, as none of them
have to do with the propriety of waiving the appellate costs, which is the sole question before the
Court. However, if the Court does up the State's other points, they are easily rejected.
First, the State contends that undersigned counsel "should not be permitted to handle" the
appeal because only the State Appellate Public Defender ("SAPD") is entitled by law to do so.
Id. It is unclear whether the State is suggesting that the Motion cannot be granted without the

SAPD on the case or is instead asserting that regardless of how the Motion is resolved the SAPD
must be appointed. To the extent it is the former, there is no connection between the waiver of
costs and the question ofrepresentation. If Mr. Pizzuto is indigent, he has a right to the waiver,
regardless of who represents him. See Idaho Code § 19-4904 ("If the applicant is unable to pay
court costs ... , these costs and expenses ... may be made available to the applicant ... on
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appeal, and paid, on order of the district court, by the county in which the application is filed."). 1
Indeed, the State once agreed, as it stipulated to an identical motion for the waiver of appellate
costs filed by the CHU in this very case before the instant I.R.C.P. 60(b) litigation began, and the
Court granted it. See Ex. 1. That means the State has either forfeited the contrary argument now
or is judicially estopped from making it-in either event, the Attorney General's one-eighty does
not justify this Court reversing the sound position it staked out itself with its earlier ruling. See
McCallister v. Dixon, 303 P.3d 578, 581 (Idaho 2012) (laying out the elements of judicial

estoppel). There is plainly no obstacle to waiving the appellate costs with the CHU on the case.
Insofar as the State is instead advancing the theory that the SAPD must be appointed no
matter what happens to the Motion, it would be making the radical suggestion that this Court
forcibly separate the CHU from its own client, who it has represented with the acquiescence of
everyone involved for decades, and replace it with an office that has never been involved in the
matter. Such a submission would be both procedurally improper and meritless.
Turning to the impropriety, there is no question before the Court regarding who
represents Mr. Pizzuto on appeal. The CHU is not asking this Court for appointment. Having
been appointed by the federal courts, it requires no such action. Essentially, the State has
attempted to file its own motion for appointment of counsel on Mr. Pizzuto's behalf. But at the
risk of stating the obvious, the Attorney General's Office does not speak on Mr. Pizzuto' s behalf,
and it has no authority to select the lawyers who represent its adversary. See United States v.
Wells, 879 F.3d 900, 913-14 (9th Cir. 2018) (refusing to accept the prosecution's attempt to

interfere in a defendant's representation, and advising that the prosecution "should tend to its

1

In this pleading, unless otherwise noted, all internal quotation marks and citations are omitted,
all alterations are in original, and all emphasis is added.
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own knitting"); United States v. Bergeson, 425 F.3d 1221, 1226 (9th Cir. 2005) (stating that "the
government is not entitled to force [opposing counsel] out of the case"); Kaley v. United States,
571 U.S. 320, 345 (2014) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (reiterating that while the right to counsel of
choice is "not absolute," "none of [its] limitations is imposed at the unreviewable discretion of a
prosecutor-the party who wants the defendant to lose"). When the SAPD is appointed, it is
because the defendant or his counsel have filed a motion requesting the office's services. It
would be extraordinary and unprecedented to install the SAPD on a case against the wishes of
both the prisoner and his attorneys, and with no request from the SAPD itself, simply because
opposing counsel would prefer to face a different office on appeal.
Should the Court elect to overlook these serious procedural problems with the State's
perspective, it still lacks any foundation in the law.
The only authority cited by the State for its belief that the SAPD alone can prosecute Mr.
Pizzuto's appeal is Idaho Code§ 19-870(1)(c), 2 see Resp. at 2, which does not even remotely
suggest the existence of such a rule. Section 19-870(1) lays out the cases that fall within the
SAPD's ambit, including post-conviction appeals. Contrary to the State's unfounded
presumption, though, the statute does not require the SAPD to take every such appeal. Indeed,
the State omits the most critical language in the statute from its Response, which provides that
the SAPD "upon appointment by the court, shall provide representation for indigent defendants
in felony criminal actions in" certain cases. § 19-870(1 ). In other words, the statute merely

authorizes the filing of motions to appoint the SAPD in certain types of cases, and arguably

2

The State mis-identifies the provision as Idaho Code § 19-870(2)(c), see Resp. at 2, but its
quotation indicates that it has in mind § 19-870(1)(c).
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obligates district courts to appoint the agency in the absence of any other volunteers. It certainly
does not forbid anyone else from working on cases within those categories.
Given the plain language of the statute, it is unsurprising that no court has ever adopted
the State's strained reading. Quite to the contrary, the Idaho Supreme Court has been allowing
the CHU to litigate capital post-conviction appeals without objection for fifteen years. See

Dunlap v. State, 360 P.3d 289 (Idaho 2015); Fields v. State, 314 P.3d 587 (Idaho 2013); Fields v.
State, 253 P.3d 692 (Idaho 2011); Stuart v. State, 232 P.3d 813 (Idaho 2010); Rhoades v. State,
233 P.3d 61 (Idaho 2010); Rhoades v. State, 220 P.3d 1066 (Idaho 2009); Row v. State, 177 P.3d
382 (Idaho 2008); Hairston v. State, 156 P.3d 552 (Idaho 2007), vacated on other grounds by
552 U.S. 1227 (2008); McKinney v. State, 150 P.3d 283 (Idaho 2006), vacated on other grounds

by 552 U.S. 1227 (2008); Hoffman v. State, 121 P.3d 958 (Idaho 2005); Porter v. State, 102 P.3d
1099 (Idaho 2004 ). And that does not even include the three cases in Mr. Pizzuto' s own
proceedings that occurred after§ 19-870 was enacted, none of which were handled by the SAPD.

See Pizzuto v. State, 233 P.3d 86 (Idaho 2010); Pizzuto v. State, 202 P.3d 642 (Idaho 2008);
Pizzuto v. State, 10 P.3d 742 (Idaho 2000). It is implausible at best to imagine that all of these
attorneys have somehow been outlawed from appearing in all of those cases under a statute that
has existed the whole time, and in spite of the Idaho Supreme Court accepting the office's
briefing in all of them-not to mention opposing counsel's own silence for more than two
decades.
The State's extreme and novel construction of the statute would wreak even more havoc
than that to the status quo. If it is true, as the State maintains, that indigent post-conviction
appeals can only be undertaken by the SAPD, then the same would be true of all direct appeals
from convictions by indigent inmates as well, for they are introduced by the same statutory
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language. See Idaho Code§ 19-870(1), (l)(a). That would mean that no county public defender,
no law school clinic, no non-profit, no law firm, and no individual lawyer could ever volunteer to
render services to a poor defendant or post-conviction petitioner on appeal. Such a drastic rule
would be unheard of and at odds with public policy, which urges the bar to offer assistance to
indigent litigants, particularly when it saves the taxpayers money they would otherwise by
spending through the SAPD. See Windom v. State, 398 P.3d 150, 153 (Idaho 2017)
("commend[ing]" counsel for representing an indigent post-conviction petitioner pro bono);
Idaho Rule of Professional Conduct 6.1, cmt. (encouraging attorneys to offer pro bono
representation, including in criminal matters).
Apart from having no foothold in the single statute upon which it relies, the State's
opinion violates a host of other legal principles.
For starters, it would unconstitutionally exclude a member in good standing of the Idaho
Bar from practicing law in a state court. The right to practice law is protected by due process.
See Dexter v. Idaho State Bar Bd. of Comm 'rs, 780 P .2d 112, 113-14 (Idaho 1989). Due process

requires that an attorney's right to practice law can only be withdrawn "for misconduct," In re
Edwards, 266 P. 665, 672 (Idaho 1928), which has not been alleged here. Moreover, statutory

law defines who is able to practice law in Idaho courts. See Idaho Code § 3-101. Undersigned
counsel was admitted to practice under those rules, and by the authority of the Idaho Supreme
Court. That is the only prerequisite to practicing law in Idaho. The State cannot invent new
requirements for certain attorneys to practice in certain types of cases based on the offices that
employ them and any such disqualification would not comport with due process.
Disqualification would also be inconsistent with counsel's First Amendment right to
lobby for Mr. Pizzuto in the courts. See NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 428-29 (1963)
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(holding that lawyers' activities are modes of expression protected by the First Amendment); In
re NH Disabilities Rights Ctr., 541 A.2d 208, 213 (N.H. 1988) (deciding that "[o]rganizations,

their members and their staff lawyers may assert a protected first amendment right of associating
for non-commercial purposes to advocate the enforcement of legal and constitutional rights of
those members, or of others within a definite class whom the organization exists to serve").
Finally, barring undersigned counsel from the appeal would infringe on the authority of the CHU
to represent its clients. See Courtney v. Butt, 572 S.W.2d 407, 408-09 (Ark. 1978) ("No
question can be raised in a state court as to whether a litigant is eligible for representation by
[Legal Services]. That agency has the primary jurisdiction, exclusive of the state, as to who is
eligible for representation by it.").
Because the State's newly invented gloss on§ 19-870(1) has no basis in law or history, it
is unnecessary to consider its fiscal implications. If they were considered, they do not help the
State. Although the State posits that it would make more financial sense to appoint the SAPD,
see Resp. at 3, that is incorrect. No matter whether the SAPD is appointed or not, the county's

expenses will be the same, i.e., the appellate costs. The only difference is that in the State's
preferred world a set of attorneys being compensated by Idaho's taxpayers have to spend a
considerable number of hours learning a case that is brand-new to them, whereas in Mr.
Pizzuto's preferred world the federally-funded lawyers who are already familiar with the
appellate issues would just stay on. There can be no serious debate about whose proposal is
more economical. The State's maneuver, if successful, would also engender delay, as the SAPD
would inevitably need more extensions on their appellate briefs than the CHU.
In sum, the State's argument meddles with the representation of its opponent, embraces a
reading of a statute that no court has ever endorsed, proposes an approach that flies in the face of
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the last twenty-two years of judicial practice, suggests a rule that would radically restrict the pool
of attorneys available to handle indigent appeals, infringes on counsel's right to practice law,
poses substantial First Amendment problems, and creates needless inefficiency. Simply put, the
argument is misplaced on numerous counts and the Court should reject it.
Changing gears, the State takes issue with the scope of the clerk's record and transcripts
outlined in Mr. Pizzuto's notice of appeal. See Resp. at 3-4.
First, the State resists the preparation of any transcripts of hearings held before the
current I.R.C.P. 60(b) proceedings that have not yet been compiled "because this Court would
not have relied upon such transcripts." Id. at 3. Whether the Court relied on the transcripts or
not, the I.R.C.P. 60(b) motion calls into question the reliability of the previous proceedings,
which included the earlier hearings. That is, the motion seeks to alter or amend the judgment
entered by Judge Reinhardt. Judge Reinhardt was present at the earlier hearings and they
informed his ruling. They are, accordingly, relevant. In this capital case, where it is prudent to
err on the side of comprehensiveness, all hearings ought to be transcribed and made part of the
appellate record.
Second, the State quarrels with Mr. Pizzuto' s proposal to place the entire record on
appeal on a single disc, speculating about the burden of the endeavor. See id. at 4. Mr. Pizzuto
is skeptical about how onerous it would be for the Court to take an existing appellate record and
place it on the same disc as a new one, and continues to feel that would be clearest.
Nevertheless, if the Court disagrees and would rather just assemble the new material, Mr.
Pizzuto is amenable to that plan so long as the staff involved are confident that the Idaho
Supreme Court has retained the clerk's record from the prior appeal-which has not always been
the case.
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DATED this 22nd day of January 2020.
/s/ Jonah J. Horwitz
Jonah J. Horwitz
Attorney for Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr.

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 22nd day of January 2020, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by method indicated below, postage prepaid where
applicable, addressed to the following:
L. LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit
Statehouse Mail, Room 10
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

_ _ _ U.S. Mail
_ _ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile
--_ _ _ Overnight Mail (Fed Ex)
_ _X_ iCourt File and Serve

/s/ L. Hollis Ruggieri
L. Hollis Ruggieri

REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION THAT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 9

Page 783

Gerald Ross Pizzuto, Jr. v. State ofIdaho
Filed in Support of Reply in Support of
Motion That Costs of Appeal Be At County Expense

Exhibit 1
(Previous Pleadings Regarding Waiver Of Appellate Costs)
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STATE.OF IDAHO,
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)

CASE NO. CV 03-3474.8
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Respondent.

Gerald Ross Piz~, .Tr., ('(Petitionern), pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17 and Idaho
Code Section 19-4904, moves that the Court order that all costs of appeal:1 inclu.d.ing the costs of

the Reporter~ s Transcript and of the Cl erk' s Reoord.1 shall be at county expense.
The reasons for. said m.otion are: the petitioner bas been detennil:1ed by the Court to be au.
indigemt pBtSOtl unable to pay the costs of litigation arising from. the prosecution. in Idaho .County
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represents to the Coun that to her knowledge the petitioner rernainsg and will contin
ue
throughout the appellate proceedings, an indigent person with no m.eam of suppor
t or

67/08

to •remain

ability to

_pay the costs of these proceedings.
WHEREFORE~ Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order
directing

that al] costs of appealt including the costs of the Clerk's Re.cord, shall be at cotlllty

eXpense.

Dated tbjs l 8tl:t day of Dece.mber; 2005.

Attorney for I1etitioner

MOTION THAT COST$ OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE. 2
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·CERTIFlCArE OE SERVICE
I hereby certify that on the 19 th day ofDecernbtr~ 2005, I caused robe served a true attd
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method .indicated below, postage prepaid where
applicabler addressed to:

Hon. George R. Reinhardt m
District Judge~ .'Retired
HCR67 Box 13
Grangeville, ID 83530

(~.S.M ~il
[ ] Hand Delivered
( JFacsimile Transmission
[ ) Federal Bx.press

L, LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
Chief; Capital Litigatio11 Unit
Special Prosecuting Attorney
for Idaho County
PO B·ox 83720

[ ] U.S. Mail ·
[ ] Hand Delivered.
[ v{Facsimile Transmission
f J Federal Express

Boise, !l) 83720

MOTIO N TB.AT COSTS OF APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE .. 3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
")
)
)

Case No. CV 03-34748

NOTICE OF HEARING

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that _ _ _ _, the _ _ day of _ _ _ , 2006 at
_ _ a.m., is hereby set as the time for Argument on Petitioner's Motion That Costs of Appeal
be at County Expense before the Honorable George Reinhardt, Senior District Judge, in the
District Courtroom of the Idaho County Courthouse, Grangeville, Idaho.
BY ORDER OF THE COURT:
Dated this _ _ day 0f _ _ _ _ _ _ 2006.

ROSE E. GEHRING, CLERK
BY: _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Kathy Johnson
Deputy Clerk
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7::JAHO COUNTY DISTRIC~ COURT

AT

ai •'/.!Jr

FILED

O'CLOCK

.M.

JOAN M. FISHER

Idaho Bar #2854
Federal Defenders of Eastern Washington &
Idaho
Capital Habeas Unit
317 West Sixth Street, Suite 204
Moscow ID 83843
Telephone: 208-883-0180
Facsi.mile: 208-883 .. 1472

Ri

EPU1Y

Attorney fo.r Petitioner-Appellant
L, LAMONT ANDERSON
Deputy Attorney Genetal
Chief~· Ca~taJ Litigation Unit
Statehouse Mail, Room 10
PO Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720~0010

Phone:208-334-4539

FEtesimile: 208-334-2942

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUD
ICIAL
ST4.TE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY DISTRICT OF THE
OF IDAB.0
GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, 41TR.,

)
)
)

Petitioner-Appellant;
v.

)
)

STATE OF IDA.RO,

)
)

CASE NO, CV 03-34748

STIPULATION

)

Respondent.

)

Petitioner/Appellant Gerald Ross Pizzuto:- Jr., by
and through his attor

ney of record, Joan

M. Fisher of the Capital Habeas Unit of the Federal

Oefr:mders <)f Ba.stem Washington and Idaho,

and Respondent, State ofldaho, tbrough its attorney

LaMont Artderson ofthe Attorney GeneraPs

Office, jointly stipulate and agree to the Ord

er granting Petitionet 9s Mot ion Tha t Costs of

Appeal

STIPULATION -1
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NO. 658

P. 6=-

fBlt H

BBi At Coun.tY&cpme.

. •aK

Dated. this u_ day
of January., 2006.

Attom&y fOr .Petitioner

Dated this

Ji day ofIa.,-,,, 2006.

Attomey for R. esr ,~ State of Idaho

SllPU.LAno N -2
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CERTIFJ.CATE Of SERYJCE
I hereby certify that on the 19th day of January,
2006, I caused to be served a true and
correct copy of the foregoing document by
the m.ethod indicated below, postage prep
aid where
applicable, addressed to:
·

Hon. George R. Reinhardt III

{Xi U.S. Mail

District Judge, Retired
HCR67Box 13
Grangeville, ID 83530

[ ] Hand Delivered
[ ] Facsimile Transmission
[ ] Federal Express

STIPULATION-3
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

GERALD ROSS PIZZUTO, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 03-34748
ORDER

THIS COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion That Costs of Appeal Be At
County Expense, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all costs of appeal, including the cost of the clerk's
record and the reporter's transcript on computer searchable disc, shall be at county expense.

DATED this _ _ day of January, 2006.

George Reinhardt, Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoing document was
served upon the following persons in the manner indicated below on the _ _ day of January,
. 2006:

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General
L.LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Joan M. Fisher
Capital Habeas Unit
317 W. Sixth Street, Ste. 204
Moscow, ID 83843

U.S. Mail
_ _ Hand Delivery
Facsimile
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF IDAHO

GERALD ROSS PIZZtrrO, JR.,
Petitioner-Appellant,

v.
STATE OF IDAHO,
RespondenL

)
)
)
)
)

CASE NO. CV 03-34748

)

ORDER

)
)
)

THIS COURT, having considered Petitioner's Motion That Costs of Appeal Be At
County Expense, therefore;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that all costs of appeal~ including the cost of the clerk's
record and the reporter's transcript on computer searchable disc, shall be at county expense.

7?
DATED this~

day of January, 2006.
orge Reinhardt, Senior District Judge
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
The undersigned hereby certifies that a true and correct copy of the foregoin~cumen t was
served upon the following persons in the manner indicated below on thec9-.:S day of January,
. 2006:

Lawrence Wasden
Attorney General

L.LaMont Anderson
Deputy Attorney General
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83 720-0010

_,,...U.S. Mail
__ Hand Delivery
Facsimile

Joan M. Fisher
Capital Habeas Unit
317 W. Sixth Street, Ste. 204
Mosc~w, ID 83843

~U.S.Mail
_
Hand Delivecy
Facsimile
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